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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the modern federal estate tax in 1916'
joint ownership of property has been a continuing problem for estate
planners. 2 Although under state law the consequences of joint own-
ership generally are favorable,3 the complex federal estate and gift
tax rules governing joint interests often produce adverse tax conse-
quences.' In the Tax Reform Act of 19766 Congress enacted a special
provision to deal with the problems of joint ownership between
spouses.' The efficacy of this special rule for spouses is questionable:
commentators have differed both as to its wisdom and proper use.'
In the Revenue Act of 19788 Congress enacted another special provi-
sion designed to alleviate the problems of joint ownership between
spouses. This provision gives credit for the services of a surviving
spouse in a jointly owned farm or other jointly owned business.,
This Note will first provide a brief background outlining the
1. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(c), 39 Stat. 756, 778. See R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GwFr TAXATION 6 (1942); see also R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIwr TAXATION 4-257 to 4-258 (4th ed. 1978).
2. See, e.g., Cole, Estate Planning and the Tax Reform Act of 1976- Inter Vivos Gifts,
Property Ownership and Planning For the Marital Deduction, 25 KAN. L. REv. 327, 349
(1977); Nordlinger, Applicability of Federal Estate Taxes to Tenancies By the Entirety Cre-
ated Prior to the First Federal Estate Tax Law, 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258 (1933); Riecker,
Joint Tenancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 801 (1966); Rosen-
berg, Gift Taxes On Estates By The Entireties, 24 TAXES 965 (1946); Wenig, Joint Property:
Spouses' Expectations and Estate Planners' Assumptions, 116 TR. & EST. 516 (1977); Note,
Joint Tenancy and Estate Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole for Transfers in Contempla-
tion of Death, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956).
3. See Part IIA infra.
4. See, e.g., Ellis, Estate and Gift Tax Planning for Termination of Joint Interests, 31
J. TAX 98, 99 (1969) ("joint interests are among the most hazardous and intricate of all forms
of ownership"); Gamble, Joint Property Interests of Husband and Wife Under the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, 55 MICH. ST. B. J. 930, 932-33 n.6 (1976) ("joint property rules remain a
maze of bewildering complexity"); Note, Internal Revenue Code § 2040: Allocation of Contri-
bution Problems, 5 U. S.F. L. REv. 166, 176 (1970) ("complicated and unsettled").
5. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1856 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 2040(b), 2515(c)).
7. Compare M. FELLOWS, SUPPLEMENT ON TAX REFORM Acr oF 1976 at 81 (1977)
and D. KAHN & E. CoLsoN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS, AND TRUSTS (2d ed. 1975)(§ 2040(b) should be repealed immediately) with Wenig, The New Fractional Interest Rule
For Spouses, 1977-2 TAX. MNGM'T (BNA) (EST., Girrs & TR. J. 4, 6, 10 (March-April 1977))(§ 2040(b) requires advisers to look more kindly on clients' desires to hold marital propertyjointly). See also, R. STEPHENS, G. MAYFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
9. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2881-82 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2040(c)). Congress also made certain technical corrections in I.R.C. § 2040(b),
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(k)(2), 92 Stat. 2763, 2933-34 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2040(d), (e)), and in I.R.C. § 2515, Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(k)(1)(A),
92 Stat. 2763, 2932 (codified at I.R.C. § 2515A).
1420 [Vol. 32:1419
JOINT INTEREST TAXATION
incidents of joint tenancy which make it an attractive form of co-
ownership under state law. This background section also will place
joint ownership in the overall perspective of federal estate and gift
taxation by pointing out the impossibility of achieving certain basic
federal estate planning objectives in an estate composed primarily
of jointly held assets. The Note will then analyze the specific provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code governing federal estate and gift
taxation of joint interests. This analysis will: first, focus on some of
the legal problems generated by the present provisions and demon-
strate the unnecessary uncertainty and complexity fostered by the
current scheme of federal estate and gift taxation of joint interests;
second, examine the estate planning alternatives available under
the present provisions and assess the consistency of these provisions
with the overall system of estate and gift taxation enacted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976; third, point out a solution to the problems
of federal estate and gift taxation of joint ownership between non-
spouses overlooked in the Tax Reform Act of 1976; and last, demon-
strate that the problems of federal estate and gift taxation of inter-
spousal joint ownership are inherent in the current scheme of federal
estate and gift taxation of married couples and that these problems
illustrate the need for comprehensive reform in this area of the
estate and gift tax law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Joint Ownership Under State Law
There are three common-law forms' of co-ownership of real and
personal property: tenacy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy
by the entirety. In a tenancy in common a theoretically unlimited
number of cotenants are each entitled to co-equal possession and
enjoyment of the entire property. Each cotenant may alienate, de-
10. "Community property" is another form of co-ownership existing in eight states.
Spouses in community property states may also hold property as joint tenants. CCH, ESTATE
PLANNING GUIDE 68 (1977).
This Note will not deal with joint ownership between spouses in community property
states. For a general comparison of the tax consequences of marital co-ownership in com-
munity property versus common-law states, see Note, The Comparative Impact of Selected
Provisions of the Tax Reform Act on Transfers of Community Property and Common Law
Property, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 443.
11. See Campfield, Estate Planning For Joint Tenancies, 1974 DUKE L.J. 669, 682-83
(1974) and authorities cited therein; Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22 TAx
LAw. 601, 601-05 (1969). For other general discussions of the state-law incidents of joint
ownership, see Banks, Unraveling Undesirable Joint Tenancies With Minimum Gift Tax
Burden, 34 J. TAx. 36, 36, 37 n.1 (1971); Thomas, Tax Consequences of Tenancies, 22 PRAc.
LAw 57, 58-59 (June, 1976); Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in
Joint Tenancy and Tenancy By the Entirety, 4 TAx L. REv. 3, 4-5 (1948).
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mise, encumber, give away during life, bequeath, or devise his indi-
vidual interest without consent of the other cotenants and without
changing the relationship of the other cotenants inter se or in rela-
tion to the transferee.12 A joint tenancy has essentially the same
features as a tenancy in common except that upon the death of one
of the joint tenants his interest in the property ends and the surviv-
ing joint tenant or tenants automatically succeed to the deceased
joint tenant's interest. Joint interests thus cannot be transferred by
descent, bequest, or devise. If a joint tenant transfers his interest
during life, the transferee becomes a tenant in common in relation
to the remaining original joint tenants, who remain joint tenants
inter se. A reconveyance of the transferred interest by the transferee
to the transferor will not restore the original joint tenancy relation-
ship unless the formal requirements for creation of a joint tenancy
are present. 3 A tenancy by the entirety is a special form of joint
tenancy that can exist only between husband and wife in which
neither spouse may transfer his or her interest without the consent
of the other.'
Joint ownership has a number of advantages under state law
that make it an attractive and very popular form of co-ownership. 5
The principal advantage is that the automatic survivorship feature
of joint ownership avoids the delay, uncertainty, and expense of
probate." Moreover, a large number of states accord preferential
estate and inheritance tax treatment to joint interests. Finally,
joint ownership is extremely popular among married couples be-
cause it provides security for dependent spouses and apparently
12. Campfield, supra note 11, at 682-83; Worthy, supra note 11, at 601-02.
13. See Campfield, supra note 11, at 683; Worthy, supra note 11, at 602-04. This Note
will not discuss the formal requirements for creation of joint tenancies nor other important
incidents of joint ownership such as limitations on the rights of creditors to reach such
property. For such general discussions, see the authorities cited in Campfield, supra note 11,
at 671-73 n.3, 683-85 nn.35-52.
14. Campfield, supra note 11, at 684-85. Twenty-two states recognize tenancies by the
entirety. Some of these states, however, do not recognize tenancies by the entirety in personal
property. See R. POWELL, 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1[ 622 nn.7 & 10 (1976). This Note
will not attempt to discuss in detail purely state-law aspects of tenancies by the entirety. It
is important to note, however, that in some states the husband is entitled to all of the income
from tenancy by the entirety property. See Worthy, supra note 11, at 605. Transfers of
tenancy by the entirety property in these states may have different gift-tax consequences than
transfers of tenancy by the entirety property in states in which each spouse is entitled to one-
half of the income. See Trees. Reg, § 25.2515-2(c)(1972).
15. For discussions of the relative advantages and disadvantages of joint ownership, see
Campfield, supra note 11, at 671-73 n.3 and authorities cited therein; Worthy, supra note 11,
at 605-09; Wenig, supra note 2, at 520, 560-61.
16. See note 15 supra.
17. For a state-by-state breakdown, see Note, Estate Tax Section 2040: Homemaker's
Contribution to Jointly Owned Property, 29 TAx LAW. 623, 635-36 nn.80-85 (1976).
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reflects and reinforces a feeling of marital partnership and unity."
United States Treasury Department statistics based on estate tax
returns filed during calendar year 1973 demonstrate the widespread
use of joint ownership. These statistics indicate that of the total
wealth held by individuals owning more than $60,000 in assets,
nearly twenty-one percent is held in some form of joint ownership."
B. Joint Ownership and Basic Objectives in Planning for the
Federal Estate Tax
One commentator has termed joint ownership the "bane of es-
tate planners."2o Because of the common practice of many unad-
vised or ill-advised married couples of acquiring property in joint
ownership, the estate planner is often confronted with the fait
accompli of an estate, potentially subject to the federal estate tax,
that is composed primarily of jointly held property.2 ' Generally, the
estate planner facing this situation will advise severance of the
joint interests for two reasons. First, inclusion of the jointly held
property in the gross estate may result in adverse federal estate tax
consequences.2 2 Second, and more importantly, the automatic survi-
vorship feature of joint ownership may thwart a very important
objective in estate tax planning under the current system-"estate
equalization" between husband and wife."
Proper explanation of the concept of estate equalization re-
quires a brief summary of certain basic features of the current fed-
eral estate and gift tax laws. 24 The federal estate and gift tax provi-
sions impose an excise tax on cumulative inter vivos and testamen-
tary taxable transfers of property. 25 The rate structure (f the tax is
18. Campfield, supra note 11, at 671-72 n.3c; Note, supra note 17, at 623.
19. U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, SUPPLEMENTAL STATISTICS OF INCOME 1972 - PERSONAL
WEALTH ESTIMATED FROM ESTATE TAX RErURNs 61 (1976) (Table G). This estimation included
in the calculation the entire value of jointly owned property except the portion attributable
to consideration furnished by surviving joint tenants. Id. (text). See Part IV A infra for a
discussion of the consideration-furnished concept. For other authorities providing background
on the extent of joint ownership, see Note, supra note 17, at 623 nn.1-6.
20. Cole, Estate Planning and the Tax Reform Act of 1976- Inter Vivos Gifts, Property
Ownership and Planning for the Marital Deduction, 25 KAN. L. REV. 327, 349 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Queenan, Division of Jointly Owned Property for Estate Planning
Purposes, 56 MASS. L.Q. 289, 289 (1971).
22. See id.; see generally Part IV A infra.
23. See, e.g., Campfield, supra note 11, at 688. See also Green and Harrleson, Tax
Reform Act of 1976: New Horizons in Estate and Gift Taxation, 48 Miss. L.J. 461, 477-80
(1977).
24. For a concise discussion of the changes made in the estate and gift tax provisions
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, see Cole, supra note 20, at 327-37.
25. Not all transfers are taxable. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2503(b) ($3,000 per donee annual
exclusion); see generally I.R.C. § 2503 and Treas. Reg. § 25.2503, T.D. 7238 (1972).
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progressive; the marginal rate increases progressively from a low of
eighteen percent on taxable amounts under $10,000 to a high of
seventy percent on taxable amounts in excess of $5,000,000.26 Each
individual is allowed a "unified credit" against the tax imposed.27
Beginning in 1981, this unified credit will be $47,000 and will allow
each individual to transfer at least $175,625 free of transfer tax.28
Each individual is allowed a gift-tax marital deduction for lifetime
transfers to a spouse; this deduction is computed as follows: A one-
hundred percent deduction is allowed for cumulative taxable trans-
fers not exceeding $100,000; no deduction is allowed for cumulative
taxable transfers in excess of $100,000 but not exceeding $200,000;
a fifty percent deduction is allowed for cumulative taxable transfers
in excess of $200,000.29 An estate-tax marital deduction is also
available for testamentary transfers to a surviving spouse." The
maximum estate-tax marital deduction is equal to $250,000 or one-
half of the adjusted gross estate," whichever is greater, reduced by
the amount by which the total gift-tax marital deductions allowed
exceed the amount that would have been allowed had the gift-tax
marital deductions allowed been limited to one-half of the cumula-
tive inter vivos taxable transfers to the spouse.32 From the foregoing
summary, it is apparent that inter vivos or testamentary transfers
of appropriate amounts of property between spouses can produce
substantial tax savings. By transferring at death to the surviving
spouse only that portion of the estate that can pass tax-free under
the estate-tax marital deduction, and by transferring the remainder
to other beneficiaries, a donor spouse may in effect have his or her
estate taxed in halves. The donor spouse thus gains the benefit of
lower progressive rates and the use of the donee spouse's $47,000
unified credit.
By comparison, in an estate consisting solely of jointly held
assets, upon the death of the first spouse the survivorship feature
of joint ownership will cause the entire property to vest automati-
cally in the surviving spouse. The portion of the property in excess
of the maximum estate-tax marital deduction will be taxed upon
the death of the first spouse. The entire property, including the
26. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501-02.
27. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505.
28. The unified credit increases progressively from $38,000 in 1979, to $42,000 in 1980,
to $47,000 in 1981. Id. $175,625 is the "exemption equivalent" of the $47,000 unified credit.
See generally, Cole, supra note 20, at 330-31.
29. I.R.C. § 2523.
30. I.R.C. § 2056.
31. See I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2)(A).
32. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1).
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portion previously taxed in the first spouse's estate, will be taxed
at a higher progressive rate upon the subsequent death of the surviv-
ing spouse." Although this "double tax" on half of the property may
be mitigated by the section 201334 credit for federal estate taxes paid
on property previously required to be included in a decedent's gross
estate, this credit declines progressively to zero over the ten-year
period subsequent to the first decedent's death.35 The existence of
the section 2013 credit also does not alter the fact that the property
is taxed at higher rates at the death of the second spouse. Inflation
may further compound the problem.
Although the preceding discussion has focused on achieving
estate equalization through use of testamentary transfers between
spouses, the importance of inter vivos transfers between spouses
cannot be ignored. If the spouse who dies first has no assets to
transfer at death, the surviving spouse loses the possibility of tax
savings through estate equalization with the deceased spouse," and
the latter's $47,000 unified credit is wasted. Under the gift-tax mari-
tal deduction, after a 100 percent deduction for cumulative inter
vivos transfers not in excess of $100,000, cumulative transfers to a
spouse in excess of $100,000 are fully taxable up to $200,000 and one-
half taxable in excess of $200,000. As a result, after $100,000 of
cumulative inter vivos transfers to a spouse, the donor spouse's
$47,000 unified credit begins to be reduced. After the unified credit
is depleted all subsequent taxable transfers result in present gift tax
liability." Thus, the gift tax provisions inhibit inter vivos estate
equalization transfers in amounts greater than $100,000.36 Whether
estate equalization will occur, therefore, may often depend upon the
happenstance of the donor spouse predeceasing the donee spouse.
This result illustrates a fundamental defect in the estate and gift
tax law because it allows important differences in tax consequences
between similarly situated taxpayers to depend entirely on chance.3"
33. This analysis assumes that the surviving spouse does not consume the property or
remarry. Because the estate and gift taxes are unified, see generally Cole, supra note 20, this
result is not altered if the surviving spouse disposes of the property by gift.
34. I.R.C. § 2013.
35. I.R.C. § 2013(a).
36. There is the possibility of remarriage for purposes of both inter vivos and testamen-
tary estate equalization. See I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523.
37. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
38. See ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION - RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INsTrrUTE, at 144-46 (1968). See also Green and Harrieson, supra note 23, at 476-77;
Wenig, supra note 2 at 518. Non-tax reasons, such as the possibility of divorce, may also make
inter vivos estate equalization impractical or undesirable.
39. See ALI RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38, at 78, 208-09 (goals of estate and gift tax
laws).
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Even if Congress were to permit 100 percent tax-free inter vivos
transfers between spouses, however, estate equalization could not be
accomplished by transfers of property by a donor spouse into joint
ownership with a donee spouse because upon the death of the first
spouse the automatic survivorship feature of the joint tenancy
would still cause the entire property to pass to the surviving spouse.
The entire property thus would be subject to a second transfer tax
upon the surviving spouse's subsequent death. 0 This problem, and
the problem of arbitrary tax consequences occuring when estate
equalization is prevented by a "donee" spouse predeceasing a
"donor" spouse, could be solved by treating married couples as a
unit for purposes of transfer taxation of property at death. The "gift-
splitting" provisions of section 25131 currently treat spouses for
purposes of taxation of inter vivos transfers in this manner.4 2
From the foregoing discussion of the conflict between joint own-
ership and estate equalization it is clear that joint ownership under
present law can have serious adverse federal tax consequences.
Much of the literature discussing joint ownership has therefore em-
phasized the need to terminate joint tenancies." Joint property,
however, will not necessarily" produce adverse federal estate and
gift tax consequences so long as the amount of property transferred
to the surviving spouse does not exceed the amount desirable for
purposes of estate equalization." In addition, when federal tax con-
sequences are minimal, as in smaller estates, the estate planner
must balance the benefits conferred upon joint ownership by state
law against the potentially adverse federal tax consequences before
recommending wholesale abandonment of joint ownership."
40. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
41. I.R.C. § 2513. See Cole, supra note 20, at 339-40.
42. This would require some method of "carrying over" the unused unified credit of a
deceased spouse. Cf. ALI RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38, at 34, 38-39 (election as to time
of imposition of tax on qualified marital deduction gift; gift-splitting at death). See also U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, JOINT PUBLICATION, 91ST CONG. 1sT SEss., Pr. 3, at 358
(Comm. Print 1969). Such a radical change in estate and gift tax policy would require a
reassessment of the importance of factors, such as the length of marriage, that currently are
not taken into consideration by the estate and gift tax laws. See Wenig, supra note 7, at 10.
Also, the proper impact of other factors such as divorce and remarriage that currently do have
an effect on estate and gift taxation of spouses would have to be reassessed. Cf. ALI
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38, at 143 (who is a spouse of the transferor). See also Cole,
supra note 20, at 339-40 (risks of gift-splitting).
43. See, e.g., Banks, Unraveling Undesirable Joint Tenancies With Minimum Gift Tax
Burden, 34 J. TAX. 36 (1971); Campfield, supra note 11; Ellis, Estate and Gift Tax Planning
for the Termination of Joint Interests, 31 J. TAX. 98 (1969).
44. See Part III infra.
45. See generally Queenan, supra note 21.
46. Id.
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III. FEDERAL GIFr TAXATION OF JOINT INTERESTS
A. Federal "Common Law"
With certain exceptions 4 7 federal gift taxation of the creation
and termination of joint interests is governed by the general Internal
Revenue Code sections'8 taxing all transfers of property made for
less than full and adequate consideration."
(1) Joint Tenancies
Upon the creation of an ordinary joint tenancy"0 in either real
or personal property, a gift for federal gift tax purposes" occurs to
the extent that one of the joint tenants contributes a greater propor-
tion of the consideration for the acquisition of the property than the
value of the fractional interest he acquires under applicable state or
federal law. Thus, if A conveys, or purchases and causes to be con-
veyed, property into the joint names of himself and B, and if B
acquires irrevocably a one-half interest in the property, A has made
a gift to B of one-half of the fair market value of the property on
the date of the transfer into the joint names of A and B.52 If, in the
preceeding example, A had furnished seventy-five percent of the
consideration and B twenty-five percent, A would be deemed to
have made a gift to B of twenty-five percent of the value of the
property." In the case of certain joint interests, such as most joint
bank accounts," some joint brokerage accounts, 5 and jointly held
United States Savings Bonds,5" the donor joint tenant can reacquire
47. See text accompanying notes 73-80 infra and Part I B infra.
48. I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1), 2512(b), 2511(a). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-1(h)(4), (5).
49. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-82.
50. In states in which contingent remainders are inalienable it may be possible to create
between non-spouses a joint interest similar to a tenancy by the entirety by forming joint life
estates subject to alternative contingent remainders in the joint life tenants. Such a joint
interest presumably would be taxable according to the general federal gift tax principles
govening tenancies by the entirety, see Part III A (2) infra, and would not be affected by I.R.C.
§ § 2515, 2515(a) the specific statutory sections applicable to joint tenancies between spouses.
See Part m B infra. See generally C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFr TAXES 748 (3d ed. 1974).
51. Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not necessary for imposition of the
federal gift tax. In general, the tax is imposed on all transfers of property made for less than
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." I.R.C. § 2512; see Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-1(g)(1).
52. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5).
53. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-83.
54. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4).
55. Rev. Rul. 69-148, 1969-1 C.B. 226.
56. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4).
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the entire property without the consent of or the obligation to ac-
count to the donee joint tenant. Thus, no taxable transfer occurs
upon the creation of these "revocable" joint interests because the
donee joint tenant does not acquire irrevocable rights in the prop-
erty.57 A taxable transfer will occur, however, if the donee joint
tenant reduces to possession or disposes of the property for his own
benefit without obligation to account to the donor joint tenant."
Lifetime termination"9 of joint tenancies also may give rise to
gift tax liability." Termination can occur in four basic ways: First,
conversion of the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common between
the original joint tenants by conveyance through a "strawman"
back to the original joint tenants as tenants in common; second,
conversion of the joint tenancy to sole ownership by conveyance by
one joint tenant of his interest to the other joint tenant; third,
conversion of the joint tenancy to sole ownership by an exchange of
properties when two or more properties are held in joint ownership;
and last, conversion of the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common
or to sole ownership by'a conveyance by one or both joint tenants
of their interests to a third party.' In the case of joint interests
created by completed transfers for federal gift tax purposes," termi-
nation will not give rise to gift tax liability so long as each joint
tenant receives in exchange for his interest the fair market value of
57. CCH, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 54-57, 63-67 (1977).
58. Id. When both joint tenants contribute to a revocable joint interest, a taxable
transfer occurs if one of the joint tenants reduces to possession for his own benefit, without
obligation to account to the other joint tenant, a portion of the property in excess of his pro
rata contribution. Id.
59. The gift tax does not apply to termination of joint interests by death. Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-2(f).
60. Termination of joint interests may also give rise to income tax consequences. For a
discussion of the gift tax, estate tax, and income tax consequences of various methods of
terminating joint ownership, see Knecht, Unwinding Joint Ownerships to Achieve Minimum
Tax Liability, 25 J. TAX. 344 (1966); see also Campfield, supra note 11, at 693-94 n.80. For a
discussion of the tax consequences of termination of joint ownership by conveyance of the
jointly held property to a charitable remainder trust, see Teitell, Estate Planning and
Philanthropy, 179 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1978).
Creation of joint interests also has income tax consequences. Any portion of the property
upon which a gift tax is paid acquires a stepped-up basis (but not greater than the fair market
value of the property at the time of the gift) to the extent of the gift tax paid. I.R.C. §
1015(d)(1). In addition, the income from jointly held property generally is divided equally
for income tax purposes between the joint tenants. Rev. Rul. 74-209, 1974-1 C.B. 46. For
comprehensive discussions of the income tax consequences of joint ownership, see Rudick,
Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy By The
Entirety, 4 TAx. L. REV. 3, 24-32 (1948); Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22
TAx LAW 601, 618-19 (1969).
61. See generally Knecht, supra note 60.
62. See text accompanying notes 50-58 supra.
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his fractional share of the property.6 3 Thus, for example, no gift tax
liability would be incurred by conversion of a joint interest to a
tenancy in common between the original joint tenants." A taxable
transfer would occur, however, to the extent of one-half of the fair
market value of the property on the date of termination when one
joint tenant gratuitously conveys his interest to the other joint ten-
ant. As pointed out earlier, in the case of "revocable" joint interests,
gift tax liability is incurred only if the noncontributing joint tenant
disposes of the property for his own benefit without obligation to
account to the contributing joint tenant."
(2) Tenancies By The Entirety
The gift tax consequences of creation and lifetime termination
of tenancies by the entirety determined according to general federal
gift tax principles" are the same as the gift-tax consequences result-
ing from creation and lifetime termination of other joint tenancies
except for valuation of the respective interests of the tenants by the
entirety. 7 Because tenancies by the entirety generally are not sever-
able by one spouse acting without the consent of the other spouse,
the values of the spouses' respective interests in the property depend
upon their life expectancies as determined according to actuarial
principles. 8 Thus, when a donor spouse having a shorter life expect-
ancy than the donee spouse creates a tenancy by the entirety and
furnishes all the consideration for the acquisition of the property,
the donor spouse makes a gift of more than one-half of the fair
market value of the property." If, in the preceding example, the
spouses had furnished equal proportions of the consideration, there
would still be a gift from the "older" spouse to the "younger."7"
Similarly, upon termination of a tenancy by the entirety, an equal
63. See generally Knecht, supra note 60.
64. Conversion to a tenancy in common between the original joint tenants does not
constitute a sale or exchange within the meaning of I.R.C. § 1002. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-
2 C.B. 507.
65. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
66. These general rules have been modified by I.R.C. §§ 2515(c)(3), 2515A. See notes
73-80 infra and accompanying text. Note also that, with respect to real property, §§ 2515(a)-
(c)(1) override the general rules. See Part m B (1) infra.
67. This analysis assumes that both spouses have equal rights to the income from the
property. In some states the husband is entitled to all of the income from the property during
existence of the tenancy by the entirety. See note 14 supra. In these states a special actuarial
factor is required in order to value the respective interests of the husband and wife. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1972).
68. See R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-83, 10-85.
69. Trees. Reg. § 25.2515-2(d) (1972).
70. Id.
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division of the proceeds71 results in a gift from the "younger" spouse
to the "older." 72
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976 7 and the Revenue Act of 1978 7
Congress reduced the complexity and adverse gift tax consequences
resulting from the requirement of actuarial valuation of interests in
tenancies by the entirety. The 1976 Act provided that actuarial
computations are not required in valuing the fractional interests of
a husband and wife in a tenancy by the entirety in real property if
the tenancy was created "either by one spouse alone or by both
spouses." 75 The 1978 Act extended this treatment generally76 to per-
sonal property, but retained the requirement that the tenancy be
created by one or both spouses.77 Thus, actuarial calculations are
still required in the case of creations of and terminations7 of tenan-
cies by the entirety acquired by spouses as a gift from a third party."
No sound reason appears for treating tenancies by the entirety ac-
quired by gift differently from those created by the spouses them-
selves. The value of the gift from one spouse to the other upon a
termination in which the proceeds are not divided in accordance
with the respective life expectancies of the parties is in no way
dependent upon how the tenancy was created." Congress should
correct this defect in the statute.
71. Conversion to a tenancy in common is equivalent to an equal division of proceeds
of a sale of the property. See R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-85.
72. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(d) (1972). See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD &
S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-85 to 10-86.
73. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
74. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
75. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1856 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2515(c)); I.R.C. § 2515(a).
I.R.C. § 2515(c) also requires an "election" under I.R.C. § 2515(a) to treat the creation
of the tenancy as a taxable transfer. See Part m B(1) infra. Generally, if no election is made
the transfer is treated as "revocable," see text accompanying notes 54-58 and 65 supra and
Part m B(1) infra; and upon termination, no gift occurs if the spouses receive the proceeds
in proportion to the consideration each furnished upon creation. See Part III B(1) infra. Thus,
if no election under § 2515(a) were made, actuarial computations could still be required even
though each spouse furnished half of the consideration. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S.
LIND, supra note 1, at 10-93. Congress should correct this technical defect in § 2515.
76. Actuarial computations are still required when the fair market value of the prop-
erty, determined as if each spouse had an unqualified right to sever his or her interest, cannot
be ascertained without reference to the life expectancy of one or both spouses. Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(k)(1)(A) (codified at I.R.C. § 2515A).
77. Id.
78. In the case of creation by gift from a third party, of course, there are no gift-tax
consequences between the spouses. The actuarial valuation requirement, however, does affect
the value of the gifts from the third party to each spouse. There appears to be no policy
justification for this requirement.
79. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-85.
80. See also notes 75 and 78 supra.
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B. Section 2515 Property
(1) Operation of the Section 2515 Exception
Section 25158' carves out an exception to the general gift-tax
rules governing creation and termination of joint interests.82 Section
2515(a) provides that the creation by either one spouse or by both
spouses 3 of a tenancy by the entirety in real property or a joint
tenancy in real property" in which only husband and wife are joint
tenants" is deemed not to be a transfer for federal gift-tax purposes
unless the donor so elects." Section 2515(a) also applies to additions
in value to the joint interest by improvements thereto or reductions
in indebtedness thereon. 7 Prior to 1977, an election to treat the
creation of an interspousal joint interest as a gift had no effect on
the tax consequences of subsequent additions in value. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976, however, amended section 2515 to provide that
an election to treat the creation of a section 2515 joint interest as a
gift applies to all subsequent additions in value."
81. I.R.C. § 2515.
82. The joint interests here referred to are the type that are "irrevocable." See text
accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
83. Section 2515 does not apply to a joint interest received by spouses as a gift from a
third party. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-86.
84. For background on the determination whether property is real property or personal
property for purposes of I.R.C. § 2515(a), see Rev. Rul. 77-423, 1977-46 I.R.B. at 14.
85. I.R.C. § 2515(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(a) (1972).
86. See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-86 to 10-89.
The election to treat a transfer of § 2515 property as a gift is made by filing a timely gift tax
return. Id. at 10-89. A return may be filed even though no gift tax is due for purposes of taking
advantage of the annual exclusion. Id. Such a "tax-free" election may be an advantage upon
lifetime termination of the § 2515 joint interest. See text accompanying notes 90-96 infra.
87. R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. Lind, supra note 1, at 10-89. Appreciation in value
of the property does not constitute an "addition." See id., at 10-90 to 10-91.
88. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1855 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2515(c)(2)). I.R.C. § 2515(c)(2) contains one important technical problem: it is
not clear from the wording of the statute whether an initial election by one spouse applies to
subsequent additions in value made by the other spouse. See Wenig, supra note 7, at 7.
Moreover, § 2515(c)(2) does not alleviate the problems in determining each spouse's contribu-
tion to a § 2515 joint interest arising upon lifetime termination, see notes 90-96 infra and
accompanying text, because it apparently permits "gift elections" for subsequent additions
in value when the initial creation of the joint interest was not treated as a gift.
The Internal Revenue Act of 1978 created another interesting technical problem with §
2515 property. In order to come within the special exception in subsection (b) of I.R.C. § 2040,
an election under § 2515(a) is required upon the creation of an interspousal joint interest in
real property. The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(k)(2), 92 Stat. 2763, 2933-
34, added § 2040(d) as a temporary measure to allow qualification of pre-1977 joint interests
without severance and recreation. Section 2040(d) accomplishes this result by allowing a
donor spouse to elect during 1977, 1978, or 1979 to pay a gift tax on the appreciation attribut-
able to that portion of the property which was a gift at the time of creation of the joint inter-
est. If the spouses made no § 2515 election upon creation, then the donor must pay gift tax
on one-half of the fair market value of the property at the time of the § 2040(d) election.
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Section 2515 does not appreciably complicate the determina-
tion of tax consequences upon the creation of a joint interest. If the
donor elects to treat the transaction as a gift, the tax consequences
are determined under the general gift-tax principles applicable to
all joint interests. If the donor makes no election, no gift-tax conse-
quences result from creation of a joint interest in section 2515 prop-
erty.89
Section 2515, however, does complicate determination of the
gift-tax consequences resulting from lifetime terminations" of inter-
spousal joint interests in realty. If the donor elected to treat creation
of and all subsequent additions in value to the section 2515 joint
interest as taxable transfers, the gift-tax consequences upon termi-
nation are the same as those determined under general gift-tax prin-
ciples:" the legal interests of both spouses under local law are
"recognized" so that no gift will occur so long as each spouse re-
ceives one-half of the proceeds.9 2 If, however, the donor did not elect
to treat either the creation of or any subsequent additions in value
to the section 2515 property as taxable transfers, section 2515(b)
comes into play. Section 2515(b) "disregards" the legal interests of
the spouses under local law, and instead recognizes only their re-
spective contributions to the acquisition or improvement of the
property. No gift will occur upon termination of a section 2515 joint
interest with respect to which the donor has never made a gift elec-
tion so long as each spouse receives a percentage of the proceeds in
proportion to his or her respective contribution to the property.13
Thus, if a wife provided all the consideration for acquisition and
improvement of a section 2515 joint interest, the husband will ac-
See generally Part IV B infra. Although new § 2040(d) makes no reference to § 2515(b), pre-
sumably the gift-tax consequences of lifetime termination of a § 2515 joint interest subse-
quent to a § 2040(d) election would not be determined under § 2515(b). General gift-tax
principles would control if the original creation of the joint interest had been treated as a gift.
It is also interesting to note that § 2040(d) attempts to solve the problem of allocating
appreciation in the value of the property when both spouses have made non-simultaneous
improvements thereto or reductions in indebtedness thereon. See notes 90-96 infra and ac-
companying text. Section 2040(d) provides that a substantial improvement of the joint inter-
est shall be treated as the creation of a separate joint interest. § 2040(d)(6). Perhaps regula-
tions will provide that reductions in indebtedness will be treated in a similar manner.
89. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-87 to 10-89.
90. For the rules defining what constitutes termination of a section 2515 joint interest,
see Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i), (ii) (1972).
91. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-93. See text accompanying
notes 50-65 supra. The general gift-tax rule requiring actuarial valuation of the interests of
husband and wife in a tenancy by the entirety was, for the most part, abolished by the Tax
Reform Act of 1978. See notes 66-80 supra and accompanying text.
92. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-93.
93. Id. at 10-89 to 10-90.
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quire a gift upon termination to the extent that he receives any
proceeds. Complications arise when contributions to the property by
both spouses do not occur simultaneously and the property appre-
ciates or depreciates in value between the contribution dates. In this
situation, the appreciation (or depreciation) in the value of the
property occuring between successive contribution dates is attrib-
uted to the spouse who furnished the consideration prior to the
occurrence of the appreciation. If both spouses furnished considera-
tion prior to the occurence of the appreciation, the appreciation
would be attributed to both." For example, assume a husband paid
the entire purchase price of $30,000 for the acquisition of real prop-
erty and took title in the joint names of himself and his wife; the
husband did not elect to treat the transfer as a gift. After the prop-
erty had appreciated in value to $50,000, the wife, also not electing
to treat the transfer as a gift, made a $30,000 improvement, which
increased the value of the property to $80,000. If the joint interest
is later terminated by a sale of the property for $100,000, the hus-
band must receive five-eighths of the proceeds and the wife three-
eighths in order to avoid an interspousal gift even though both con-
tributed equally to the property. Although the tax consequences of
the preceding example are easily computed, this is not always the
case. For example, when both spouses make nonsimultaneous pay-
ments on a long-term mortgage, both make nonsimulataneous im-
provements to the property, and the value of the property fluctuates
considerably, it can become virtually impossible to ascertain the
relative contributions of the spouses (adjusted for appreciation) .1
The problem becomes more complex when the donor elected to treat
some contributions as gifts. This situation requires a further alloca-
tion of the proceeds between the "gift contributions" and the
"nongift contributions.""
Another complicated gift-tax problem arises upon termination
by gift from both spouses to a third party of a section 2515 joint
interest that was not elected to be treated as a taxable transfer when
it was created. Because the spouses may divide the proceeds from
the termination of a section 2515 joint interest as they desire, the
regulations properly treat the value of the proceeds received by each
spouse as the amount reported by that spouse as a gift to the third
94. Id. at 10-92.
95. Id. The regulations provide that if gradual appreciation and numerous contribu-
tions prevent ascertainment of each spouse's respective contribution with reasonable cer-
tainty, appreciation can be disregarded. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2) (1972).
96. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(c) (1972).
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party." Thus, if each spouse reported a gift to the third party of one-
half the value of the property, the transaction would be treated as
a taxable transfer of one hundred and fifty percent of the value of
the property. The donee spouse would be considered to have made
a gift to the third party of fifty percent of the value of the property.
The donor spouse also would be considered to have made a gift to
the third party of fifty percent of the value of the property. In
addition, under section 2515(b) the donor spouse would have made
a gift to the donee spouse of fifty percent of the value of the prop-
erty. 8 The donor spouse could avoid this result by reporting the
entire value of the property as a gift to the third party and having
the donee spouse report no gift to the third party."
Another important principle in planning for termination of sec-
tion 2515 joint interests is that although section 2515 governs the
gift-tax consequences of termination of a section 2515 joint interest,
it has no effect on section 2035, which requires inclusion in the gross
estate of gifts made within three years of death. 0o Thus, when both
spouses terminate by gift to a third party a section 2515 joint inter-
est that was not elected upon creation to be treated as a taxable
transfer, and the donee spouse dies within three years of the termi-
nation, one half of the value of the property will be included in the
donee spouse's gross estate under section 2035 as a gift occuring
within three years of death. This result occurs even though all of the
proceeds were allocated to the donor spouse under Section 2515(b)
and the donor spouse thus reported no gift to the third party.""
97. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(3) (1972). For purposes of determination of the amount
of proceeds received by each spouse, the amount reported as a gift by each is determined
without regard to the "gift-splitting" provisions of § 2513. Id.
98. See Ellis, Estate and Gift Tax Planning for the Termination of Joint Interests, 31
J. TAX. 98, 100-01 (1969).
99. Cf. id. at 101 (suggesting that the "step transaction" doctrine might prevent this
result). But see Rev. Rul. 76-348, 1976-2 C.B. 267.
100. Rev. Rul. 76-348, 1976-2 C.B. 267. The rationale of this ruling is based on recogni-
tion under I.R.C. § 2035 of the property interests of both spouses under local law. Id. at 268.
See also the authorities cited in the following paragraph.
Although there does not appear to be any authority squarely on point, it seems clear that
a § 2515(b) "gift allocation" could not prevent inclusion of any portion of the property in the
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 (transfers with retained life estate), I.R.C. § 2037 (transfers
taking effect at death) and I.R.C. § 2038 (revocable transfers). See Rev. Rul. 76-348, supra,
at 268; see also Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Estate of Koussev-
itsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945); Estate of May, T 78,020 T.C.M. (P-H) (Jan. 18, 1978); Campfield,
supra note 11, at 706-53.
101. Rev. Rul. 76-348, supra note 100. In the example given in text, if the spouses had
converted their § 2515 joint interest into a tenancy in common, § 2035 would not apply
because both spouses would be considered to have received full and adequate consideration
for the relinquishment of their interests in the joint tenancy. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD
& S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-248 & n.74.
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Although this result may at first seem anomalous, when it is con-
sidered in conjunction with the results reached by courts constru-
ing the interrelationship of sections 2035-38 and section 2040 (the
estate tax provision governing the consequences of termination by
death of joint interests),"' and in light of the policy considerations
discussed below, it appears a proper and equitable interpretation.
(2) Planning and Policy Considerations
Congress enacted section 2515 in 1954 as a relief measure de-
signed to prevent a large majority of married couples, ignorant of
the gift-tax consequences of acquiring homes in joint names, from
incurring deliquency penalties.IO3 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the considerations in deciding whether to elect gift-tax treat-
ment upon the creation of a section 2515 joint interest were rela-
tively simple. Election was desirable only when: the spouses ex-
pected the property to appreciate substantially in value and
planned to terminate the joint interest during life and to distribute
the proceeds other than in proportion to their respective contribu-
tions;'o and when no gift tax liability would be incurred because of
the gift-tax marital deduction and $3,000 annual exclusion.'o In all
other situations, an election merely resulted in a payment of tax
that otherwise would have been deferred until the death of the donor
spouse or might never have been incurred because only that portion
of the property attributable to the consideration furnished by the
donee spouse would be included in his or her gross estate if the donee
spouse predeceased the donor spouse.o' The Tax Reform Act of
1976, however, injected another consideration into the decision
whether to elect gift-tax treatment upon creation of a section 2515
joint interest. In certain circumstances, an election may now be
desirable if the spouses anticipate that they will hold the property
until one of them dies. 07
In those situations in which an election of gift-tax treatment
is not especially desirable, the ability to avoid gift-tax conse-
102. See Part IV A(3) infra. See also note 100 supra.
103. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1954).
104. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 10-94 to 10-96. An
election in this situation allows the donor to transfer the appreciation without gift-tax conse-
quences. Id. For an approach to decision-making under § 2515 based on the time-value of
money, see Banks & Due, Joint Realty and the Gift Tax Election, 54 TAXES 250 (1976).
105. See id. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the gift-tax marital deduction was a
flat fifty percent. In this situation a mortgage on § 2515 property could be amortized at the
rate of $12,000 annually without gift-tax cost. See CCH, ESTATE PLANNING GUDE 60 (1977).
106. See Part IV A(1) infra.
107. See Part IV B infra.
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quences on an interspousal transfer of real property can be an
important planning device to further estate equalization and thus
effect substantial estate-tax savings. The typical situation is one in
which a husband transfers income-producing realty into the joint
names of himself and his wife and does not elect gift-tax treatment.
Because under local law each spouse generally is entitled to one-half
of the income from joint property, this technique appears to be a
device to transfer assets from one spouse to another without the
normal gift-tax consequences."'s Although the Commissioner could
argue that the receipt of income by a donee spouse from section 2515
property not elected for gift-tax treatment at its creation constitutes
a gift from the donor spouse, no cases or administrative rulings
address this point."c'
Section 2515 introduces a great deal of complexity into the law
of federal gift taxation of marital joint interests. The section may
represent a substantial "loophole" in gift taxation of interspousal
transfers. Moreover, the rationale for the enactment of section 2515
has lost much of its force since the enactment of the one-hundred
percent gift-tax marital deduction for the first $100,000 of inter-
spousal transfers.' Although reform cannot be considered without
reference to its impact on the new elective estate-tax provision gov-
erning termination by death of interspousal joint interests,"' the
need for reform is apparent.
IV. FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION OF JOINT INTERESTS
Section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code governs federal es-
tate taxation of joint interests; death of a joint tenant triggers appli-
cation of the provision. Section 2040(a), the general rule, applies to
all joint interests; section 2040(b), added by the Tax Reform Act of
1976,112 and section 2040(c), added by the Revenue Act of 1978,"1 are
special elective provisions applicable only to certain interspousal
joint interests. In contrast to the rules governing gift taxation of
joint interests, the rules governing estate taxation of joint interests
are rather easily and simply stated. The complexities, legal prob-
lems, and difficulties in planning fostered by the estate-tax provi-
108. See, e.g., Johnson, Meeting the Pre- and Post-Death Problems of Jointly Held
Property, 20 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx. 227, 240-41 (1962) (suggesting this technique).
109. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gwr TAXEs §§ 30.8-
.10 (3d ed. 1974).
110. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Part IV B infra.
112. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1855 (codified at I.R.C. § 2040(b)).
113. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2881-82 (codified at I.R.C. § 2040(c)).
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sions, however, are as great or greater than those arising under the
gift-tax provisions.
A. Section 2040(a) - The General Rule
(1) Basic Operation
Section 2040(a) provides that the gross estate shall include:
First, the entire value of all property held jointly by the decedent
and any other person, except any portion that the decedent's execu-
tor can attribute to contibutions to the acquisition or improvement
of the property made by the surviving joint owner or owners with
funds or property that were never acquired from the decedent for
less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth; and second, the value of the decedent's fractional share of
all jointly held property acquired by the decedent and the other
joint owner or owners from third parties by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance."' Thus, for example, when A and B acquire property
as joint tenants, A paying $80,000 of the purchase price and B pay-
ing $20,000, if A later dies after the property has appreciated in
value to $200,000, $160,000 will be included in A's gross estate. If A
and B had acquired the property by gift from a third party, only
one-half of the value of the property would be included in the gross
estate of either A or B."5
Section 2040(a) applies to all joint interests, including joint
bank accounts, jointly held government bonds, and other jointly
held instruments."' The operation of section 2040(a) is not affected
by whether the joint interest in question is "revocable" or
"irrevocable" for gift-tax purposes,"' or whether, in the case of sec-
tion 2515 property, an election was made upon creation of the sec-
tion 2515 joint interest to treat the transfer as taxable."' The gift-
tax consequences upon creation of a joint interest are thus irrelevant
for purposes of section 2040(a)."' Gift-tax consequences may never-
theless reduce the estate tax payable, however, because if a gift tax
was paid or payable upon creation of the joint interest, the estate
114. D. KAHN & E. COLSON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIrS, AND TRUsTs 80 (2d
ed. 1975); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, supra
note 1, at 4-233 to 4-234.
115. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at
4-239 to 4-240.
116. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b); D. KAHN & F. COLSON, supra note 114 at 86-87. See
also Rev. Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399.
117. See Part m A supra.
118. See Part m B(1) supra.
119. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-237.
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will be entitled to either a credit for gift tax paid or a subtraction
for gift tax payable in the estate tax computation, depending upon
when the joint interest was created.120 Some commentators have
referred to this combined scheme of gift tax and subsequent estate
tax as "double taxation," 2' and its constitutionality has been chal-
lenged on this ground.122 It has long been settled, however, that the
imposition of a gift tax upon creation of a joint interest and subse-
quent taxation of the entire property in the estate of the donor joint
tenant does not constitute double taxation in the constitutional
sense.'" It is also clear that the present scheme of estate and gift
taxation of joint interests does not constitute double taxation in any
practical sense except to the extent that the credit for prior gift
taxes does not equal the full amount of gift tax paid. For some joint
interests created prior to January 1, 1977, the effective date of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, the gift-tax credit is inadequate and some
double taxation may occur.124 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 corrected
this problem by providing in the estate tax computation a full sub-
traction for gift taxes payable on gifts made subsequent to Decem-
ber 31, 1976.125 Of course, if the donee joint tenant predeceases the
donor joint tenant, although none of the value of the joint interest
will be included in his gross estate (assuming he furnished none of
the consideration), the gift tax paid or payable by the donor joint
tenant is lost because the survivorship feature of the joint interest
causes the property to revert to the donor's sole ownership. The
property will then be subject to another gift tax or estate tax upon
subsequent transfer.126 This problem, however, is not the fault of the
federal tax law but results because of the automatic survivorship
feature of the joint interest.
The real effect of section 2040(a) is to outlaw a "completed gift"
of a fractional share in a joint interest when the donor remains a
joint tenant with the donee until the former's death. This is easily
illustrated by reference to the federal estate and gift tax treatment
120. Id.
121. See Thomas, The Tax Consequences of Tenancies, 22 PRAc. LAW 57, 64 (June 1,
1976); Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22 TAx LAW. 601, 615 (1969).
122. See R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girr TAXATION 395-403 (1942); see also Rosen-
berg, Gift Taxes on Estates by the Entireties, 24 TAXEs 965 (1946); Note, Taxation-Joint
Tenancy-Tenancy by the Entirety-Federal Taxation Aspects, 27 N.D. L. REV. 407 (1951).
123. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257 to 4-258.
124. See Schwartz, Joint Tenancy and the Federal Tax Law, 101 Ta. & EST. 1151, 1153,
1188 (1962).
125. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2)).
126. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 122, at 965.
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of tenancies in common.12 7 The gift-tax consequences of creation of
a tenancy in common are very similar to those of creation of a joint
tenancy. If A pays the entire consideration for the acquisition of
property and acquires title in the names of himself and B as tenants
in common, A has made a gift to B of one-half the fair market value
of the property on the date of the transfer. Upon the subsequent
death of A or B, however, only one-half the value of the property is
included in the gross estate of either.2 8 Of course, under the "unified
system" of estate and gift taxation enacted by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, the value of A's gift to B is included in the ultimate calcula-
tion of the tax upon A's cumulative inter vivos and testamentary
transfers. Any appreciation, however, in the value of B's interest in
the property occuring between the date of the gift and the date of
A's death is not included.129 With a joint tenancy, on the other hand
the full fair market value of the property on the date of A's death
would be included in his gross estate and thus enter into the calcula-
tion of total transfer tax liability. Section 2040(a), therefore, pre-
vents a donor joint tenant from making a completed gift of the
fractional share in the joint interest acquired by the donee joint
tenant because it prevents the donor joint tenant from removing
from transfer taxation subsequent appreciation in the value of the
fractional interest transferred.
(2) Establishing Survivor's Contribution
The decedent's executor has the burden of proving what portion
of the value of a joint interest is attributable to consideration fur-
nished by a surviving joint owner or owners and as such is thus
excludable from the decedent joint owner's gross estate.30 Because
the general rule of section 2040(a) could otherwise easily be circum-
vented, the statute specifically provides that the survivor's contri-
bution must never have been acquired from the decedent by gift. 3 1
This rule introduces a "tracing" requirement that can significantly
compound the executor's problems in meeting the burden of proof.32
127. The characteristics of a tenancy in common under state law are essentially the
same as those of joint ownership except that in a tenancy in common there is no survivorship
feature. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
128. CCH, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 67-68 (1977).
129. See Cole, supra note 20, at 338-39.
130. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2); R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1,
at 4-245.
131. I.R.C. § 2040(a) (1st proviso); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2040-1(a)(2), (c)(4).
132. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-240; Riecker, Joint Ten-
ancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 801, 810 (1966). For exam-
ple, the use of joint bank accounts creates special problems because the executor must not
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Joint ownership is most often employed in marital and other
family situations; the non-arm's-length nature of making contribu-
tions to joint interests increases the difficulty of proof. Inadequate
or nonexistent record-keeping by taxpayers frequently results in in-
clusion in the decedent joint owner's gross estate of a greater portion
of the value of the joint interest than is actually attributable to the
decedent's contribution . 3 In response to these problems some
courts have allowed an "equitable approximation" of the respective
contributions to the property. Other courts, however, have adopted
stringent standards of proof.13 1
In addition to difficult factual problems in determining the
relative contibutions of the decedent and survivors to a joint inter-
est, section 2040(a) creates technical and legal problems in estab-
lishing survivors' contributions. As in the case of lifetime termina-
tions of section 2515 joint interests,13 ' when contributions in the
form of improvements or reductions in indebtedness are made non-
simultaneously by both the decedent and the survivor or survivors
and the property fluctuates in value between the contribution dates,
allocation of the respective contributions between the decedent and
survivors becomes complicated, if not impossible.36
Several legal issues have surfaced concerning whether a surviv-
ing joint tenant acquires certain types of contributions from the
decedent by gift within the meaning of section 2040(a). The regula-
tions take the position that income from property acquired by gift
from the decedent is not itself acquired by a gift within the contem-
plation of section 2040(a) and therefore may constitute a valid con-
tribution by a surviving joint tenant.' Somewhat inconsistently,
however, the regulations also provide that appreciation in value of
property acquired by gift from the decedent and later contributed
to the acquisition cost of a joint interest doeg not constitute a valid
contribution. 3 The courts have rejected this latter position at least
only trace the funds to a source other than decedent, but must also prove that the survivor
did not withdraw the contributions. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra, at 4-246.
133. See, e.g., Giacopuzzi v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1777 (1970). See also
cases cited in 1 A. CASNER, SUPPLEMENT To ESTATE PLANNING 1008-10 (1978); R. STEPHENS, G.
MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-245 to 4-247 nn. 54-65; Riecker, supra note 132, at
811 nn. 29-36.
134. See note 133 supra.
135. See Part 111 B(1) supra.
136. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text. For discussions of this problem as
it relates to § 2040, see R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-243 to 4-245;
Note, Internal Revenue Code § 2040: Allocation of Contribution Problems, 5 U.S.F. L. REV.
166 (1970).
137. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(5).
138. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(4). For an opinion that the distinction between income
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in part. Swartz v. United States3 and First National Bank v.
United States"' both held that the portion of proceeds from sale of
gift property representing appreciation in value of the property oc-
curring subsequent to the date of the gift from the decedent does
constitute a valid contribution for purposes of section 2040(a).
Endicott Trust Co. v. United States, "I however, refused to recognize
appreciation in value of gift property as a valid contribution when
the donee and decedent jointly held the gift property, sold it, and
reinvested the proceeds in the joint interest in question. From an
economic standpoint, Endicott seems indistinguishable from
Swartz and First National Bank.142 Acceptance of the taxpayer's
argument in Endicott, however, would certainly tempt the estate
planner to advise a sale and repurchase of appreciated joint prop-
erty in contemplation of the donor joint tenant's death."' It would
also suggest a bolder argument, in direct conflict with the
"incomplete gift" principle of section 2040(a),11 that even unreal-
ized appreciation in the value of property held jointly by the dece-
dent and survivor constitutes a valid contribution. Another problem
in establishing contribution of a surviving joint owner is the proper
treatment of reductions by the decedent joint owner in the indebt-
edness upon the joint interest. In Bremer v. Luff'45 it was held that
when the survivor was jointly and severally liable with the decedent
upon the mortgage, the survivor would be deemed to have contrib-
uted equally to the purchase of the property even though the dece-
dent in fact paid off the mortgage. Legal scholars have criticized this
result.'" There appear to be no clearly correct answers to the legal
problems presented by the section 2040(a) "consideration-
furnished" rule. 47 This Note submits that these problems demon-
strate the inherent unsoundness of the rule.
Difficult problems also occur in establishing a survivor's contri-
bution to joint property acquired with funds derived from jointly
and appreciation lacks substance, see Dean, Federal Tax Consequences of Joint Ownership,
53 GEo. L.J. 863, 867 (1965).
139. 182 F. Supp. 540 (D. Mass. 1960).
140. 223 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
141. 305 F. Supp. 943 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
142. Cf. R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-243 nn. 45-46 (propriety
of Endicott questionable).
143. See id. at 4-243.
144. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
145. 7 F. Supp. 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1933).
146. See Note, Assumption of Joint Mortgage As Avoidance of Federal Estate Tax on
Tenancy by Entirety, 44 YALE L.J. 687 (1935). See also CASNER, supra note 133, at 1003; R.
STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-247.
147. See generally Dean, supra note 138, at 864-67; Reicker, supra note 132, at 812-15.
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conducted income-producing activity. Such problems can be partic-
ularly troublesome in the husband-wife relationship because of the
absence of arm's length dealing. These problems are considered in
Part IV C as an introduction to new section 2040(c), which was
enacted to deal with them.
(3) Interaction of Section 2040(a) With Sections 2035, 2036, and
2038
Because section 2040 applies only to property held jointly at the
death of one of the joint tenants, termination of joint interests prior
to death can be utilized to avoid inclusion of the entire value of
jointly held property in the gross estate of a donor joint tenant."' If
none of the other estate-tax provisions49 requiring inclusion of the
property in the gross estate apply, the gift-tax rules discussed in
Part III of this Note govern the tax consequences of termination of
a joint interest.5 0 In certain situations, such as conversion of the
joint interest to a tenancy in common when creation of the joint
interest was a completed gift for gift-tax purposes, no gift-tax conse-
quences occur upon lifetime termination.'-" As will become apparent
from the following discussion, substantial tax savings can result
from lifetime termination of joint interests.
After several losing battles in the courts, the Commissioner, in
1969, acquiesced in a series of casesl 52 holding that when a joint
interest is terminated in contemplation of death' section 2040 does
not apply, and that section 2035 requires inclusion in the donor joint
tenant's gross estate of only the value of the decedent's fractional
interest under local law transferred for less than full and adequate
consideration."' The rationale of these cases is that, under section
2035, local property law, not section 2040, should determine the
value of the interest transferred. 5 ' The commentators have uni-
formly and correctly criticized this result as permitting an easy
148. See generally R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-248 to 4-
250; D. KAHN & E. CoLsoN, supra note 114, at 83-86; Campfield, supra note 11, at 706-15;
Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy
by the Entirety, 4 TAX L. REV. 3, 11-13 (1948).
149. E.g., I.R.C. H9 2035-38.
150. See note 148 supra.
151. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
152. See Campfield, supra note 11, at 706-11.
153. I.R.C. § 2035 now requires inclusion in the gross estate of all property transferred
within three years of death for less than full consideration.
154. 1969-2 C.B. xxiii; see also Rev. Rul. 69-577, 1969-2 C.B. 173.
155. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-249 to 4-250 (a literal
reading of § 2035).
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avoidance of section 2040.11" The following example"' illustrates this
point. A and B are joint owners of stock. A provided the entire
purchase price for acquisition of the stock. The transfer of the stock
into the joint names of A and B was a completed gift for gift-tax
purposes. In this situation, section 2040(a) provides for inclusion of
the entire value of the stock in A's gross estate and inclusion of none
of the value of the stock in B's gross estate. If on the day before A's
death, A and B transfer the stock by gift to X, only one-half the
value of the stock would be included in A's gross estate. If B then
died within three years of the transfer to X, however, one-half the
value of the stock would also be included under section 2035 in his
gross estate. The potentially adverse tax consequences to B in the
preceding example can be avoided if A alone transfers his interest
in the stock to X. The potential tax savings of this termination-in-
contemplation-of-death technique can thus be quite substantial.'"
One further point with respect to section 2035 and termination of
joint tenancies must be noted: A termination in anticipation of the
death of the donor joint tenant is not effective to save taxes when
the creation of the joint interest occurs within three years of the
donor joint tenant's death. In this situation section 2035 would re-
quire inclusion of the entire value of the property in the donor ten-
ant's gross estate by virtue of the transfer occurring at the creation
of the joint interest.''
Termination of joint interests by methods that subject the
property to inclusion in the gross estate under sections 2036 and
2038 receive treatment similar to that of section 2035 terminations.
When two joint tenants own the property, only one-half of its value
is included in the gross estate of either. If, in the preceding example,
A and B had transferred their stock to an irrevocable trust reserving
a life estate for their joint lives, upon the death of either, only one-
half of the value of the stock would be includible in the gross estate
156. E.g., D. KAHN & E. CoLsON, supra note 114, at 86; R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD &
S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-250; Campfield, supra note 11, at 712-15; Note, Joint Tenancy
and Estate Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole For Transfers in Contemplation of Death,
66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956).
157. Termination cannot be considered without regard to the gift-tax consequences, see
Part m supra, and the income-tax consequences, see Part IV A (4) infra.
158. See generally note 148 supra. If in the example given in the text, A and B had
converted the joint interest to a tenancy in common, there would be no gift-tax consequences;
section 2035 would be inapplicable because the receipt by A and B of equal interests in the
tenancy in common in exchange for their relinquishment of their joint interests would consti-
tute full consideration; and only half the value of the stock would be includible in the gross
estate of either A or B. See R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 11, at 4-248 &
n. 74.
159. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-248.
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under section 2036.60 One slight difficulty, however, exists with re-
spect to section 2038.1e The estate planner must take care that the
joint interest is clearly severed. The Commissioner has contended
with some success that a transfer of jointly held property to a revoc-
able trust should be disregarded as a sham and section 2040 ap-
plied.' The tax-saving potential of section 2036 and 2038 termina-
tions is generally equivalent to that available by straight termina-
tions or section 2035 terminations. 163
One other intriguing nuance in the operation of section 2040(a),
although not involving sections 2036 and 2038, and not necessarily
involving section 2035, merits discussion at this point. Section
2040(a) apparently could be used to return property to a donor
without incurring transfer tax upon the return transfer. In Estate of
Koussevitskye' a husband had given property to a wife. Shortly
before her death, the wife transferred the property into the joint
names of herself and her husband. The Commissioner argued that,
under sections 2040 and 2035, the wife's gross estate should include
the entire value of the property. The Commissioner conceded that
section 2040 would have required the inclusion of the property's
entire value in the gross estate of the husband had he died first. The
court therefore decided against the Commissioner on the section
2040 issue on grounds of consistency in application of the statute.
The court then agreed that the property could be included in the
wife's estate under section 2035, but found that the joint interest
was not created in contemplation of death.' Presently, the wife's
gross estate would include the property in the Koussevitsky situa-
tion because section 2035 now requires inclusion of all gifts made
within three years of death. 6 The Koussevitsky principle, however,
could easily be extended to a situation in which section 2035 would
be inapplicable because the creation of the joint interest was not a
gift. For example, if in Koussevitsky the husband had contributed
to the creation of the joint interest property equal in value to that
contributed by the wife, no gift by the wife to the husband would
have occurred upon creation of the joint interest. There do not ap-
pear to be any cases litigated on this point nor any recommenda-
tions by tax planners to utilize this method. The potential for tax
160. Id. at 4-249 to 4-250.
161. I.R.C. § 2038 (inclusion of revocable transfers).
162. See Campfield, supra note 11, at 728-32.
163. See generally COH, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 50-52 (1977).
164. 5 T.C. 650 (1945). These references are to I.R.C. §§ 2035, 2040. These sections
correspond to §§ 811(c) and 811(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
165. See Campfield, supra note 11, at 710 n.147; Rudick, supra note 148, at 11.
166. I.R.C. § 2035.
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avoidance with this technique, however, is substantial; a court
might refuse to allow this sort of manipulation on the rationale that
the transactions in question are shams.167 Again, this Note submits
that these problems demonstrate the inherent unsoundness in the
general rule of section 2040(a).
(4) Jointly Held Property and Stepped-Up Basis
Section 1014"8 provides for a step-up in basis to the fair market
value on the date of the decedent's death, or alternate valuation
date, for property included in the decedent's gross estate.' The Tax
Reform Act of 1976, however, provided that a decedent's basis is to
be carried over to his estate or beneficiaries with a fresh start step-
up adjustment to the fair market value of the property on December
31, 1976.170 The Revenue Act of 1978 postponed the effective date of
the carryover basis provisions until 1980 and it now appears uncer-
tain whether stepped-up or carryover basis will be in effect after
1980.'1 To the extent that future law allows a fresh start adjustment
to the value of the property on December 31, 1976, basis considera-
tions will for some time continue to be important in estate planning
for jointly held interests.
It may sometimes be advantageous to the surviving joint ten-
ants to have jointly held property included in the decedent's gross
estate in order to obtain a step-up in basis even with the resulting
increase in estate taxes.172 Section 2040(a) requires inclusion in the
gross estate of the entire value of a joint interest except any portion
the executor proves is attributable to contributions of the surviving
joint tenants. The portion of the property required to be included
in the decedent joint owner's gross estate receives the step-up in
basis. 73 The survivor does not, however, have an election to receive
the step-up in basis by failing to prove contribution in the estate
proceeding. To establish the step-up in basis for income-tax pur-
poses, the survivor has the burden of proving what portion of the
property section 2040(a) required to be included in the decedent's
167. See, e.g., Homer's Estate v. Comm'r, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942) (dealing with
joint property and a revocable trust).
168. I.R.C. §§ 1014(a), (b)(9).
169. See CASNER, SUPPLEMENT OF ESTATE PLANNING 994 (1978).
170. Id. at 995. The adjustments are slightly more complex than represented by the
text. See I.R.C. § 1023.
171. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
172. CASNER, supra note 169, at 994.
173. This basis increase is reduced by depreciation and depletion deductions allowed
to the survivor for income tax purposes prior to the decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-
(6).
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gross estate.7 4 The survivor may obtain the equivalent of an elec-
tion, however, by manipulation of the contribution test of section
2040(a). " The effectiveness of this technique is dependent upon a
correct prediction of which joint owner will die first; but, to the
extent that joint ownership is desirable in the overall estate plan,
this method may achieve some tax savings. 7
(5) Planning For Joint Ownership and the Overall Estate Plan
Although joint ownership affords significant advantages under
state law, 77 the presence of too much jointly held property in an
estate can produce adverse federal estate-tax consequences through
"overfunding" of the estate-tax marital deduction and loss of the
possibility of lifetime estate equalization. To the extent that joint
ownership is desirable in the estate plan, however, the contribution-
furnished rule of section 2040(a) affords a possibility of tax savings.
In a situation in which potential joint owners have independent
means so that the contribution-furnished rule can be manipu-
lated, 7 1 the joint owners might take a calculated risk that the joint
owner with the longer life expectancy will survive.'"7 By allowing the
"younger" joint owner to provide the entire consideration for all
joint property, no portion of the property would be subjected to
estate taxation upon the death of the "older" joint owner. The es-
tate planner could not, of course, utilize this technique without
regard to the gift-tax consequences of creation of joint interests.
When utilized in conjunction with the gift-tax rules treating crea-
tion of certain types of joint interests, such as joint bank accounts
and section 2515 property, as nontaxable transfers this technique
may afford significant tax savings.'
(6) A Policy Critique of Section 2040(a)
Section 2040(a) has remained substantially unchanged since
enactment of the first modern federal estate tax in 1916.18, Until
enactment of the federal gift tax in 1932, the contribution-furnished
174. Richard v. Madden, 52 T.C. 845 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 440 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.
1971).
175. See Part IV A (1), (2) supra.
176. See Part II B infra.
177. See Part II supra.
178. See generally Part IV A(3) supra.
179. Such a prediction could be based not only on age, but also on sex, health, occupa-
tion, family history, etc.
180. The estate planner must also evaluate this technique in light of the basis consider-
ation outlined in Part IV A (4) supra.
181. See note 1 supra.
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test of section 2040(a) perhaps made sense as a revenue protecting
measure.1 S2 With the advent of the gift tax, however, the justifica-
tion for treating joint interests differently from tenancies in common
disappeared.'a From an economic viewpoint, a joint interest does
not differ from a tenancy in common in which the cotenants have
made wills devising the property to each other. The joint owners
may unilaterally sever the joint interest and destroy the survivor-
ship relationship; the tenants in common may unilaterally revoke
their wills. The possessory incidents of the two forms of ownership
are virtually indistinguishable."' The only types of joint interests to
which the application of the contribution-furnished test makes
sense are those joint interests, such as joint bank accounts, in which
under local law the donee acquires no irrevocable rights in the prop-
erty.'" With these "revocable" joint interests, the entire transfer
occurs, if at all, at the death of the donor and should be taxed at
that time. With respect to all other types of joint interests, as ex-
plained earlier in the discussion of section 2040(a), the contribution-
furnished rule, compared to the federal estate and gift tax treatment
of tenancies in common, discriminates against joint interests by
preventing a donor from making a completed gift of a fractional
joint interest and thus removing subsequent appreciation in the
value of that fractional interest from transfer taxation. 88
182. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257. The "estate deple-
tion" theory was the basis for enactment of the federal gift tax. 2 R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND Girr TAXATION 962-64 (1942). The gift tax also prevents income tax avoidance to some
extent by taxing gratuitous transfers of property. See ALI RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38,
at 71.
183. Cf. Note, Joint Tenancy and Estate Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole For
Transfers In Contemplation of Death, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956) (suggesting a "substantial
control" theory). For the federal estate and gift tax treatment of tenancies in common, see
notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Part II A supra. This argument is also supported by the fact that under general
principles of federal gift-tax law, because each joint owner may unilaterally sever his interest,
actuarial calculations are not required in order to value the interest received by a joint tenant
upon creation of the joint interest. Creation of joint interests and creation of tenancies in
common are thus generally treated identically for federal gift-tax purposes. See Part 11 A
supra and notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text. The situation with respect to a tenancy
by the entirety is essentially the same as that of the "irrevocable" joint tenancy because both
husband and wife acquire irrevocably vested rights under local law upon creation of the joint
interest. The only difference between a regular joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety
lies in valuation of the respective interests of the spouses. The actuarially younger spouse has
a more valuable interest. See Part m A (2) supra. See also Rosenberg, Gift Taxes on Estates
By The Entireties, 24 TAXEs 965 (1946) (discussing cases sustaining imposition of gift-tax
upon creation of tenancies by the entirety).
185. The contribution-furnished rationale also would apply to § 2515 property. As
stated earlier, however, the rationale for continuing the § 2515 option is highly questionable.
See Part Ill B(2) supra.
186. See Part IV A(1) supra.
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Since 1947 reform proposals recommending integration of the
estate and gift taxes have advocated abolition of the contribution-
furnished test except in the case of "revocable" joint interests. 87
These proposals have recommended that joint interests be taxed in
the same fashion as tenancies in common.18 1 In view of the complex-
ity, potential for manipulation, and discriminatory treatment of
joint interests fostered by the contribution-furnished test, and in
view of the widespread extent of joint ownership,' it is surprising
that Congress did not correct these problems when it integrated the
estate and gift taxes in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.90 Instead Con-
gress enacted a special provision, applicable only to interspousal
joint interests, that allows spouses to elect to have joint interests
either taxed like tenancies in common or taxed under the old
contribution-furnished rules."' Without question, Congress should
abolish the contribution-furnished rule for joint interests of non-
spouses. This Note defers a conclusion on whether spouses should
be allowed to elect this treatment until after discussion of the com-
plexities fostered by this new option.
B. Section 2040(b) - "Fractional Interest" Rule For Spouses
(1) Basic Operation of the Rule
Section 2040(b) provides that in the case of any qualified joint
interest, one-half the value of the property will be included in the
gross estate of the first spouse to die, regardless of which spouse
furnished the consideration for the property.'9 2 A joint interest is
qualified and the rule of section 2040(b) is mandatory if the joint
interest meets the following four requirements: First, one or both
spouses must have created the joint interest after December 31,
187. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE TREASURY DEP'T, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION: A
PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME TAX (1947); ALI
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38; HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, JOINT PUBLICATION, 91st CONG., 1ST SESS., PT. 3 TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS,
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T (Comm. Print 1969).
188. See Platt, Integration and Correlation - The Treasury Proposal, 3 TAX. L. REV.
59, 61 (1947).
189. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
190. This failure on the part of Congress has not gone unnoticed by commentators
discussing the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See, e.g., Gaubatz, The Unfinished Task of Estate
and Gift Tax Reform, 63 IOWA L. REV. 85, 101-02 (1977); cf. Cole, supra note 20, at 349
(problem "eased" but potential for litigation with IRS still present). But see R. STEPHENS,
G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257 (applauds limiting changes to interspousal
joint interests until effects seen).
191. I.R.C. § 2040(b).
192. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(1). See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra
note 1, at 4-250.
1448 [Vol. 32:1419
JOINT INTEREST TAXATION
1976;1" second, only the decedent and the decedent's spouse may be
joint owners;"' third, in the case of personal property, the creation
of the joint interest must have been, in whole or in part, a completed
gift for federal gift-tax purposes;"' and last, in the case of real prop-
erty, the joint tenants must have made an election under section
2515 to treat the creation of the joint interest as a gift."' The Reve-
nue Act of 1978 provides a temporary elective procedure, available
through 1979, for bringing otherwise qualified pre-1977 joint inter-
ests within the rule of section 2040(b).m This procedure does not
require severance and recreation of the joint interest."' In order to
make the election, the donor spouse must report a gift of the prop-
erty in an amount equal to the appreciation attributable to the
portion of the property that was a gift upon the creation of the joint
interest."' For real property, if the donor spouse made no section
2515 election upon creation, the amount of the gift will equal one-
half the fair market value of the property.20' After 1979, severance
and re-creation will again be required in order to bring pre-1977
joint interests within the rule of section 2040(b) .201 The amount of
the gift occuring upon post-1979 re-creation, however, must still be
determined according to the temporary rules for qualification with-
out severance."'
Although section 2040(b) is mandatory if all the requirements
for a qualified joint interest are met, the provision is, in effect,
193. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(A); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c)(1),
(d)(3), 90 Stat. 1520, 1856.
194. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(C).
195. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(B)(i).
196. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(B)(ii). Recall that an initial election under § 2515 now carries
over to subsequent additions in value to the property. See note 88 supra and accompanying
text.
197. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(k)(2), 92 Stat. 2763, 2933-34
(codified at I.R.C. § 2040(d), (e)).
198. The donor spouse makes the election by filing a timely gift-tax return for any
calendar quarter in 1977, 1978, or 1979. The election may not be made after the death of the
donor spouse. I.R.C. § 2040(d)(1), (2).
199. I.R.C. § 2040(d)(3), (4). The election may be made even if the amount of the gift
thus determined is less than the $3,000 annual exclusion. I.R.C. § 2040(d)(2).
200. I.R.C. §§ 2040(d)(4), (5). This is also the case when a gift of personal property was
not reported and the statute of limitations on assessment has expired. Id. For further discus-
sion of § 2040(d), see note 88 supra.
201. I.R.C. § 2040(e).
202. Id. If this were not the rule, § 2040(b) could be elected with slight or no gift-tax
consequences: when the pre-1977 creation of a joint interest was a completed gift, generally,
no gift will occur upon termination so long as the proceeds are divided equally between the
joint owners, see generally Part m supra; by varying slightly from a 50-50 proportion the
contributions to re-creation, spouses could qualify under § 2040(b) by a very small gift upon
re-creation.
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elective for both real property and most personal property.2 03 For
real property the situation is fairly simple: if the donor spouse elects
under section 2515 to treat the creation of the joint interest as a gift
and the property meets the other requirements of section 2040(b) (2),
upon the death of either spouse the fractional interest rule will
apply; if no section 2515 election is made the general rule of section
2040(a) will apply.211
The situation is somewhat more complicated in the case of
personal property. First, certain types of joint interests in personalty
cannot qualify at all for fractional interest treatment because of the
requirement that a gift occur upon creation of the joint interest. 20 5
For example, joint bank accounts generally cannot qualify because
no gift for federal gift-tax purposes occurs upon creation since under
local law the donee usually acquires no irrevocably vested rights in
the account. 20 8 These types of joint interests will continue to be
governed by the contribution-furnished rule. 207 For joint interests in
personalty that can qualify for fractional interest treatment, the
estate planner can avoid the mandatory rule of section 2040(b) and
invoke the contribution-furnished rule of section 2040(a) by careful
manipulation of the requirement that a gift occur upon creation of
the joint interest. A simple example illustrates this procedure.2 8 In
1979 H creates a joint interest with his own funds between himself
and his wife, W, in stock having a fair market value of $100,000.
Upon creation of this joint interest, a gift from H to W of $50,000
occurs and thus section 2040(b) applies: under section 2040(b), the
gross estate of the first spouse to die will include one-half the value
of the stock.200 If, in the preceding example, H had contributed only
$50,000 of the purchase price of the stock and W had contributed
the other $50,000 from funds previously acquired by gift from H, no
gift would occur upon creation of the joint interest. The
203. See generally M. FELLOWs, SUPPLEMENT ON TAX REFORM AcT or 1976 (1977) to D.
KAHN & E. COLSON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATEs, Gwrs, AND TRUSTS (2d ed. 1975); R.
STEPHENS, G. MAXFIFLD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-250 to 4-257.
204. See text accompanying notes 192-96 supra.
205. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(B)(i).
206. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
207. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER T.R.A. 1976 24-25 (1977).
208. For this and other examples, see M. FELLOws, supra note 203, at 59-62.
209. If the $50,000 gift to W was a taxable gift, $50,000 will be included in H's total
transfer tax computation under § 2001(b)(1)(B), but subsequent appreciation in W's frac-
tional share of the stock occurring subsequent to the gift will not be subject to transfer tax.
If, however, H dies within 3 years of the creation of the joint interest, the full fair market
value on the date of H's death of W's fractional share of the stock will be included in H's
gross estate under § 2035.
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contribution-furnished rule of Section 2040(a) would apply:2 10 if H
predeceased W, his gross estate would include the entire value of the
stock; if W predeceased H, her gross estate would include none of
the value of the stock. 2 11
(2) Planning and Policy Considerations
The basic advantage of the fractional interest rule of section
2040(b) over the consideration-furnished rule of section 2040(a) is
that the former allows a donor to exclude from transfer taxation
appreciation in the value of the fractional interest transferred, while
the latter requires inclusion of the entire value of the property in the
donor's gross estate.212 On the other hand, if the donee predeceases
the donor, the fractional interest rule requires inclusion of one-half
the value of the property in the donee's gross estate, whereas the
consideration-furnished rule requires none of the value of the prop-
erty to be included."' In addition the fractional interest rule requires
that the creation of the joint interest be treated as a gift, while in
the case of a joint interest in real property between spouses, no such
requirement exists.' Similarly when the estate planner contem-
plates the qualification of a pre-1977 joint interest, he or she must
consider the gift-tax consequences. 215 Basis considerations also are
important in any decision to elect fractional interest treatment.
Under the consideration-furnished rule, the entire property obtains
a step-up in basis if the donor spouse dies first; if the donee spouse
dies first, however, no step-up in basis occurs. In contrast, the frac-
210. This example assumes that the transactions would not be subject to attack by the
IRS as sham or as collapsible under the step-transaction doctrine.
211. An interesting question presented by the second example is whether the $50,000
acquired from H previous to the creation of the joint interest (assuming the transfer was a
post-1976 taxable gift, not falling within the annual exclusion or marital deduction) would
also be includible in H's total transfer tax calculation under § 2001(b)(1)(B) as an adjusted
taxable gift. Adjusted taxable gifts are those "other than gifts which are includible in the
gross estate of the decedent." I.R.C. § 2001(b). Section 2040(a) here requires inclusion of the
property represented by the $50,000 prior gift to W; yet, the creation of the joint interest was
not a gift from H to W. If H had created the joint interest entirely with his own funds (prior
to the effective date of § 2040(b)), the gift to W upon creation would be includible in H's
gross estate under § 2040(a) and thus not includible as an adjusted taxable gift. The fact that
the transaction giving rise to the gift is not the same one that requires inclusion in the gross
estate, compare I.R.C. §§ 2035-40, should not cause the gift to be included twice in the
calculation. Even literally, the $50,000 is a "gift . . . includible in the gross estate of the
decedent." Any other interpretation would result in double taxation merely because of the .
inherent unsoundness of § 2040(a) in the overall scheme of the unified system. See also notes.
164-67 supra and accompanying text.
212. See text accompanying notes 183-86 supra.
213. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
214. See notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 197-202 supra and accompanying text.
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tional interest rule ensures that half the property will obtain a step-
up in basis on the death of the first spouse.21 6
If the fractional interest rule were available on an elective basis
for nonspouses, the foregoing considerations would provide an op-
tion to speculate on which joint owner would die first. Although this
may sometimes be important in planning for joint ownership be-
tween spouses, the primary consideration in the husband-wife situa-
tion is the effect of joint interests upon the basic goal of estate
equalization. 217 The discussion below will illustrate some of the con-
siderations relevant to the decision whether to elect fractional inter-
est treatment. The discussion considers three basic situations: First,
when estate equalization is not contemplated; second, when only
deathtime equalization is contemplated; and last, when lifetime
equalization is contemplated or has already occured. For purposes
of simplicity, this discussion will ignore basis considerations?.18
Situation 1
When a husband and wife do not desire ultimate tax savings
through estate equalization, and instead simply wish to pass as
much property with as little tax cost as possible to the survivor,
joint ownership may be the most desirable method.2 19 When the
spouses contribute unequally to the acquisition of the joint prop-
erty, qualification under the fractional interest rule may be advan-
tageous. If, by using the $3,000 annual exclusion and contributions
of the "poorer" spouse the couple accumulates a joint estate consist-
ing solely of qualified joint interests with a value not in excess of
$850,000, and neither spouse makes lifetime gifts to third parties,
no tax will be imposed upon the vesting at death of all the joint
property in the survivor. If the couple must utilize the $100,000 gift-
tax marital deduction 2 0 to help qualify the joint property for frac-
tional interest treatment, the tax imposed at the death of the donor
spouse is only $15,800.221 If a second $100,000 transfer to the donee
spouse is necessary in order to qualify all the joint property, the tax
imposed at the death of the donor rises to $32,300. If, however, the
donor spouse had not made this second $100,000 transfer, with the
result that $200,000222 of the joint property would not qualify for
216. See generally Part IV A (4) supra.
217. See generally Part II supra.
218. Deductions and credits other than the marital deduction and unified credit are also
ignored.
219. See Part H B supra.
220. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
221. Wenig, supra note 7, at 9.
222. This situation assumes no appreciation in value of the property.
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fractional interest treatment, a tax of $45,050 would be imposed at
the death of the donor spouse even though the second $100,000
transfer to the donee spouse was a taxable gift.2n This curious result
is caused by the interaction of the gift-tax and estate-tax marital
deductions, which estate planners must always take into account
when planning for interspousal joint interests.2 24
The foregoing examples illustrate to a limited extent the inter-
action of the fractional interest rule with the marital deductions and
the unified credit. The examples do not, however, take into account
the important intangible factor of appreciation. As interspousal
gifts necessary to qualify joint property approach the $350,000
mark, the point at which the unified gift-tax credit is exhausted and
tax will become currently due on subsequent transfers not falling
within the $3,000 exclusion,22 the estate planner must weigh the
advantage of excluding from transfer taxation subsequent apprecia-
tion in value of the donee's fractional interest against the gift-tax
consequences of qualification.228 It also is likely that around the
$350,000 interspousal transfer mark, the ultimate value of the joint
property upon the death of the first spouse, given inflation, will
exceed $850,000. At this point another intangible factor, the possibl-
ity that the donee spouse may predecease the donor spouse, must
be taken into account because $425,000 (one-half of the $850,000
223. Comparison of tax imposed when $200,000 of joint property does not qualify under
fractional interest rule:
$200,000 in $100,000 in
marital gifts marital gifts
Total Value of Joint Property $850,000 $850,000
Amount Included In Donor
Spouses' Gross Estate 425,000 525,000
Minus Marital Deduction (250,000) (212,500)*
Taxable Estate 175,000 312,500
Adjusted Taxable Gifts 100,000 -
Taxable Amount 275,000 312,500
$200,000 in $100,000 in
marital gifts marital gifts
Tentative Tax 79,309 92,050
Minus Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Tax Imposed $32,300 $ 45,050
* reduced because of $100,000 gift-tax marital deduction, see § 2056 (c) (1) (B).
224. For a discussion of the interaction of the gift-tax and estate-tax marital deductions
and the unified credit, see Cole, supra note 20, at 341-44.
225. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
226. The illustration given in note 233 infra demonstrates the importance of inflation
in this calculus.
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joint estate) is the maximum amount that will be returned to the
donor tax-free upon the donee spouse's death.22 7 Despite the com-
plexities in planning for the fractional interest rule, in many situa-
tions it will allow spouses to hold significant amounts of property
in joint ownership without the disadvantages existing under prior
law. This result is, of course, inimical to the tax-saving objective of
estate equalization, but many couples are willing to pay the price. 228
Situation 2
In contrast to situation one, this example presents one spouse
who owns substantially all of the assets. Although this spouse is not
interested in lifetime estate equalization because of the resulting
loss of control, equalization at death is contemplated through use
of a maximum estate-tax marital deduction. The primary difference
between this example and situation one is that joint interests will
make up only a relatively small portion of the estate.2 29 Thus, in this
situation the effect of qualification of joint interests under the frac-
tional interest rule on the donee spouse's estate will not be a factor.
A primary consideration in this instance is the effect of fractional
interest qualification on the estate-tax marital deduction. Unless
the formula for determining the estate-tax marital deduction takes
into account the fact that qualification removes a portion of the
property from the donor's adjusted gross estate (the figure upon
which the estate-tax marital deduction is computed in an estate
larger than $500,000), rather than being equalized upon the donor
spouse's death, the estates may become lopsided and produce a
greater total transfer tax.230
The benefit of removing subsequent appreciation from the
227. This assumes full use of the unified credit and estate tax marital deduction on the
theory that the donee spouse would never have made any gifts to the donor or third parties.
When substantial appreciation is anticipated and the donee spouse's life expectancy is
somewhat greater than the donor's, the calculated risk of qualification may be warranted.
See Sacks, An Estate Planning Tool - Severance and Recreation of Joint Tenancies, 24 PRAc.
LAW 71, 73-76 (1978); cf. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257 (wonders
whether game is worth the candle if wrong spouse dies first); Cole, supra note 20, at 350-51
(doubtful whether benefits to be obtained are attractive enough to encourage widespread
use). The decision is somewhat analogous to that presented by the § 2515 election. See Part
m B supra. For an approach to decision-making under that section based on inflation and
the time-value of money, see Banks & Due, Joint Realty and the Gift Tax Election, 54 TAXEs
250 (1976).
228. See generally Wenig, supra note 2.
229. Typically in this situation, the couple will only hold the family residence and a
small amount of personal property jointly. Only a small percentage of the donor spouse's
assets will be held jointly with the donee spouse because of the loss of control attendant upon
joint ownership.
230. See M. FELLOWS, supra note 203, at 76-80 (Illustration h).
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donor's gross estate is not of much value when the spouses contem-
plate deathtime equalization because the donor wishes half of his
estate to be taxed at his death, with the other half being taxed at
his spouse's death. Moreover, to the extent that taxable transfers to
the donee spouse are incurred to qualify property for fractional in-
terest treatment, total transfer taxes will be increased." If, how-
ever, the donor spouse wishes to provide security for the donee
spouse by the use of a certain amount of joint property, or wishes
to sacrifice ultimate tax savings by overqualifying the estate-tax
marital deduction to provide the donee spouse with more assets for
enjoyment during his or her lifetime,232 qualified joint interests may
be useful for transferring subsequent appreciation to the donee
spouse without tax costs. To the extent, however, that taxable
transfers would be incurred in order to qualify joint interests in an
estate subject to high marginal rates of taxation, subsequent appre-
ciation in the value of the fractional interest transferred would have
to be quite substantial in order to offset the adverse tax conse-
quences of section 2040(b) qualification? 3 Section 2040(b) is thus
of only marginal utility to spouses in situation two.
Situation 3
In a situation in which lifetime equalization of estates is con-
templated or has already occurred, the presence of any significant
amount of jointly held property will frustrate the equalization objec-
231. Such transfers would come into the total transfer tax computation as adjusted
taxable gifts. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B). See M. FELLOws, supra note 203, at 75-76, 80
(recommending complete avoidance of the fractional interest rule).
232. The adverse effects of this plan are mitigated somewhat by the deferral of tax
between the donor spouse's death and the donee spouse's death. Moreover, the donee may
consume part of the property or remove substantial portions of it from taxation by use of the
$3,000 per donee annual exclusion (or the spouse may remarry). See also note 233 infra.
233. The following illustration is taken from M. FELLOWS, supra note 203. It and the
additional calculations provided below it indicate the importance of appreciation in the
operation of the fractional interest rule in the context of estate equalization.
Illustration:
In 1990, H independently owns an estate of $900,000. He and his wife, W, own a home,
which has a value of $100,000, in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. This home
was purchased in 1981 for $80,000 cash. H provided 90 per cent of the consideration for
the home, and W provided the remaining 10 per cent of the consideration. W owns no
other property. Table A demonstrates the effect of a [§] 2515 election and the effect of
[§] 2040(b) on the total transfer taxes owned by the couple if they were to die in the
near future. Despite the [§] 2515 election, assume that the gift tax marital deduction,
[§1 2523, along with the annual exclusion, [§] 2503(b), results in no taxable gift at
the time the joint tenancy was created and that [§] 2515 was elected. Assume further
that no other gifts were made by either spouse and that H takes advantage of the
maximum estate tax marital deduction. ([§§] 2053 and 2054 deductions are ignored).
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tive. The automatic survivorship feature of the joint interest will
cause it to pass to the surviving spouse rather than into a marital
H predeceases W
Table A: Table B:
§ 2040(b) § 2040(a)
(a) H's estate taxes
Property in adjusted gross estate
not including home $ 900,000 $ 900,000
Home 50,000 90,000
Total adjusted gross estate 950,000 990,000
Minus Marital Deduction* (462,000) (495,000)
Taxable Estate 488,000 495,000
Adjusted taxable gifts 0 0
Tentative Tax Base 488,000 495,000
Tentative Tax 151,720 154,100
Minus Gift Tax Payable 0 0
Tax calculated under § 2001 151,720 154,100
Minus Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Estate Tax Due 104,720 107,100
* § 2056: 50% of the Adjusted Gross Estate reduced because of lifetime marital
deduction gift.
(b) W's estate taxes
Property in Adjusted Gross Estate
not including home $ 412,000 $ 405,000
Home 100,000 100,000
Taxable estate 512,000 505,000
Adjusted Taxable gifts 0 0
Tentatixe tax base 512,000 505,000
Tentative Tax 160,240 157,650
Minus Gift Taxes Payable (0) (0)
Tax calculated under § 2001 160,240 157,650
Minus Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Estate Tax Due 113,240 110,650
In the above example the total estate taxes are $210 greater if § 2040(b) is elected
and H predeceases W. Although the effect would not be very great here, having less tax
due at H's death and more due at W's subsequent death produces a valuable deferral of
tax. The total estate taxes are the same whether or not § 2040(b) is elected if W dies
first. (The calculation for W predeceasing H is omitted). M.FELLows, supra note 203, at
76-80 (Illustration h) (citations omitted).
If, in the preceding example, the home had appreciated in value to $160,000 instead
of only $100,000 the total estate taxes if H predeceases W are the same whether or not §
2040(b) is elected. The calculations are provided below:
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deduction trust or directly to the ultimate beneficiaries? 4 Because
the estate-tax marital deduction is equal to at least one-half of the
adjusted gross estate, and because joint interests will make up a
very small portion of the estate, qualification is unnecessary. The
joint property can pass to the survivor tax-free under the estate-tax
marital deduction. Moreover, if a taxable transfer occurs in qualify-
ing a joint interest, higher total transfer taxes will be incurred be-
cause the gift upon qualification will enter the total transfer tax
computation as an adjusted taxable gift. 5 Thus, to the extent that
a couple with equal estates deems joint property desirable, qualifi-
cation under the fractional interest rule generally should be
avoided.
In enacting section 2040(b), Congress intended to reduce the
complexity of estate and gift taxation of joint interests. 6 It is clear,
Table A: Table B:
§ 2040(b) § 2040(a)
(H predeceases W)
(a) H's estate taxes
Property in Adjusted Gross Estate
not including home $ 900,000 $ 900,000
Home 80,000 144,000
Total adjusted gross estate 980,000 1,044,000
Minus Marital Deduction (Q 2056) 477,000 522,000
Taxable estate 503,000 522,000
Adjusted taxable gifts (0) (0)
Tentative tax base 503,000 522,000
Tentative Tax 156,910 163,940
Minus Gift tax payable (0) (0)
Tax calculated under § 2001 156,910 163,940
Minus Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Estate Tax Due 109,910 116,940
(b) W's estate taxes
Property in Adjusted Gross Estate
not including home $ 397,000 $ 378,000
Home 160,000 160,000
Taxable Estate 557,000 538,000
Adjusted taxable gifts 0 0
Tentative Tax Base 557,000 538,000
Tentative Tax 176,890 169,860
Minus gift taxes payable (0) (0)
Tax calculated under § 2001 176,890 169,860
Minus Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Estate Tax Due 129,890 122,860
In either instance, 2040(a) or 2040(b), the total transfer tax is $239,800.
234. See Part II B supra.
235. See M. FELLOWS, supra note 203, at 70-76.
236. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) ("present application of the
provisions relating to jointly owned property are unnecessarily complex").
1979] 1457
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
however, that although section 2040(b), when it applies, eliminates
the complexities in determining which spouse furnished the consid-
eration for joint property,23 7 section 2040(b) increases the overall
complexity of taxation of joint interests.* As the examples provided
above illustrate, section 2040(b) makes planning for joint interests
more difficult; it can be a trap for the unwary.29 The provision does,
however, remove discriminatory tax treatment of joint ownership for
those married couples who wish to utilize it. Couples who do not
desire estate equalization and wish to hold the bulk of their property
in joint ownership can benefit greatly from the fractional interest
rule. When spouses contemplate equalization at death, these bene-
fits diminish and become virtually non-existent when the couple
desires full inter vivos and testamentary equalization. The elective
character of section 2040(b) thus mitigates the inherent problems of
joint ownership in the current scheme of federal estate and gift
taxation of spouses. This election should be available to account for
the differing objectives of married couples. 240 Whether the overall
benefit achieved by section 2040(b) is outweighed by the increased
complexity it introduces is questionable. Congress should reform
the estate and gift tax code as it relates to interspousal transfers and
estate equalization. 241
C. Section 2040(c) - Optional Rule Giving Credit for Surviving
Spouse's Services in a Jointly Held Farm or Business
Establishing the contributions of a surviving spouse, particu-
larly a wife, to marital joint interests for purposes of section 2040(a)
is complicated by the non-arm's-length nature of the transactions
giving rise to those contributions. Congress recognized this in enact-
ing the fractional interest rule of section 2040(b) in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. After noting the existing problems in this regard, the
House Report on section 2040(b) states that "[t]he effect of includ-
237. See, e.g., Cheifetz, Joint Tenancy: New Law Simplifies Estate Tax Consequences
of This Type of Ownership, 18 TAX ACCOUNT. 270 (1977) (use of joint tenancy enhanced by
elimination of the tracing requirement).
238. To this effect, see M. FELLOWS, supra note 203, at 55 (increases complexity); R.
STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-257 (further proliferation and complica-
tion); Gamble, Joint Property Interests of Husband and Wife Under the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 55 MIcH. S.B.J. 930 (1976) (further complication of the rules).
239. See, e.g., Salo, Joint Ownership of Assets in Georgia - The Fiduciary Lawyers'
Labyrinth, 14 GA. S.B.J. 14 (1977) (advising the utmost of caution).
240. Even though joint ownership may frustrate the goal of estate equalization, many
couples, for psychological reasons, nevertheless desire to hold a certain amount of property
- the family home, etc. - in joint ownership.
241. See Part II B supra. Cf. Wenig, supra note 7, at 519-20 (suggesting that Congress
merely allow tax-free transfers by one spouse into the joint names of both spouses).
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ing only one-half the value of the property in the gross estate in
these situations is to implicitly recognize the services furnished by
a spouse toward accumulation of the jointly owned property."242 The
fractional interest rule as earlier demonstrated, has no relation to
services performed by a spouse, and will result in no benefit what-
soever unless the qualified property appreciates in value. 213
In a further effort to grapple with this problem, Congress, in the
Revenue Act of 1978, enacted still another elective provision de-
signed to give credit for the services of a surviving spouse in a jointly
owned farm or other business. The provision allows an exclusion of
a portion of the value of the joint interests used in the trade or
business based upon the number of years of material participation
of the surviving spouse.2 4 This section analyzes the problems of
establishing contributions of a surviving spouse to marital joint in-
terests and assesses the effectiveness of new section 2040(c) in deal-
ing with those problems.
(1) Prior Law
a. Contributions of Property
It is clear that if a wife245 contributes her separate funds or
property2" to the acquisition or improvement of jointly held prop-
erty, and proves this after the husband's death,247 the wife's contri-
butions constitute "consideration in money or money's worth" for
purposes of section 2040(a).211 The contribution must, however, be
traceable directly to the joint interest in question. 249 For example,
if a wife contributes her separate funds for the support of the family,
242. H.R. REP., supra note 236, at 20.
243. See generally Part IV B supra.
244. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2881-82 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2040(c)).
245. This section will refer to the surviving spouse as the wife. This is not done to
perpetuate sexual stereotypes, but because in all the cases referred to herein the surviving
spouse attempting to prove contribution was in fact the wife. In addition, with respect to
certain legal issues discussed in this section, such as whether a wife's domestic services can
constitute consideration for purposes of § 2040(a), gender is relevant.
246. The funds or property must be shown not to have been acquired from the husband
for less than full and adequate consideration. A wife's relinquishment of dower, or other
marital rights in the husband's estate does not constitute consideration. I.R.C. § 2043(b).
Release of rights to maintenance and support, however, does qualify. Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-
2 C.B. 414. See also Note, Valuation of the Right to Support for Purposes of the Federal Tax
System, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 132 (1972).
247. See generally Part IV A (2) supra.
248. R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 1, at 4-247.
249. See Estate of Leoni, 17 T.C.M. (P-H) 678 (1948) (widow established joint owner-
ship of original fund, part of the proceeds of which were used to acquire the properties in
question).
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and the husband later transfers property into joint ownership with
the wife to recompense her for previous outlays, the wife's prior
expenditures do not constitute consideration for acquisition of the
joint interest. To benefit under section 2040(a), the wife must dem-
onstrate that her expenditures were loans to the husband that he
became legally obligated to repay and did in fact repay by the
transfer of property into joint ownership.2s The harsh results pro-
duced by this rule are illustrated by McGrew's Estate v.
Commissioner.251 In McGrew certain judgments had been rendered
against the husband at a time when he was ill. The wife discharged
these judgments using, in part, her separate property. Later, the
husband transferred funds to a joint bank account for the purpose
of reimbursing the wife for the expenditure of her separate property.
In affirming the Board of Tax Appeals' holding that the entire bal-
ance of the joint atcount was includible in the husband's gross
estate, the court found that the wife had failed to sustain the burden
of showing that she had made the expenditures with the expectation
of repayment.252
Because it is unrealistic to require couples like the McGrews to
keep the kind of records necessary to sustain such a burden, the
American Law Institute in 1968 recommended that Congress permit
one hundred percent tax-free interspousal transfers.23 Nevertheless,
establishing a surviving spouse's contributions to the acquisition or
improvement of joint interests is still a problem in the current
scheme of federal estate and gift taxation of spouses.
b. Contributions of Services
The performance of domestic services by a wife does not consti-
tute consideration for purposes of section 2040(a) .254 The wife's legal
obligation to render such services, even though not directly enforce-
able, renders them invalid as consideration.?5 The services of a wife
rendered to her husband outside the domestic situation, however,
250. Fox v. Rothensies, 115 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1940) (under state law there was no pre-
sumption of a loan in this circumstance).
251. 135 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1943).
252. Id. at 162.
253. ALI RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 38, at 32-33. "[The imposition of a transfer
tax on the movement of property from spouse to spouse . . . forces them into an unnatural
recordkeeping . . . if the law is to be complied with . . . [a] 100% marital deduction . . .
would . . . bring to full fruition from a tax standpoint the often expressed attitude of husband
and wife that the property is 'ours' without regard to the technical legal ownership require-
ments."
254. Note, Estate Tax Section 2040: Homemaker's Contribution To Jointly Owned
Property, 29 TAx LAw. 623 (1976).
255. Id. at 628.
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can constitute consideration.?' The wife may render these services
as an employee,27 or under a profit-sharing58 or partnership agree-
ment.25 The husband and wife must be able to contract for such
services under local law;260 such an agreement must, in fact, exist
between them, either express or implied. 2 1 Services rendered by a
spouse gratuitously cannot constitute consideration for purposes of
section 2040(a) .22
The wife must, of course, show that she contributed her com-
pensation for services rendered, and in what amount, to the acquisi-
tion of the joint interests in question .2 1 When the wife is an em-
ployee of the husband this "tracing" requirement becomes quite
stringent.2 4 In the profit-sharing agreement and partnership situa-
tions, however, the courts are sometimes willing to assume that the
contribution of the wife equalled that of the husband and to allow
exclusion of one-half of the jointly owned property shown to have
been acquired with profits from the joint enterprise. 285 In order to
receive this favorable treatment, the estate need not prove exactly
equal contributions of property or services to the joint enterprise.2 6
Formal agreements are not necessary; nor is it conclusive how the
couple reported the joint income for income-tax purposes."' Even
when the spouses show a clear agreement to share profits, however,
the profits must be traceable into the joint property.28 It also must
not appear that the joint property is primarily attributable to capi-
tal furnished by the husband. 26' Two cases illustrate this point. In
256. R. STEPHENs, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LmD, supra note 1, at 4-247.
257. Estate of Ehret v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432 (1976).
258. Berkowitz v. Comm'r, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939).
259. Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
260. See, e.g., Estate of Waterman, 9 T.C.M. (P-H) 841 (1940) (state statute invalidat-
ing contracts for services between spouses had no effect on husband-wife joint venture).
261. Estate of Trafton, 27 T.C. 610, 615 (1956); Estate of Fletcher, 44 B.T.A. 429, 434
(1941).
262. Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
263. E.g., Estate of Drazen, 48 T.C. 1 (1967).
264. Id. Compare Estate of Ehret v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432 (1976) (commis-
sioner's determination deemed generous) with Estate of Carpousis v. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (P-
H) 1064 (1974) (Cohan equitable approximation rule applied).
265. Compare Estate of Ensley v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1627 (1977) with Estate
of Otte v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 317 (1972).
266. Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Otte v. Comm'r, 4
T.C.M. (P-H) 317 (1972).
267. United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
268. Estate of Drazen, 48 T.C. 1 (1967).
269. See Estate of Ensley v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1627 (1977). See notes 274-77
infra and accompanying text.
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Singer v. Shaughnessy270 at the time of the couple's marriage the
husband was a salesman for a book publishing company and also
owned a small publishing business of his own. Although the wife
contributed no original capital to the business, from the time of the
marriage until the husband's death she took an active part in run-
ning it. For some years after the marriage, the husband continued
to work as a salesman, devoting only his spare time to the business.
He later gave up his other work in order to devote all his time to
the business. The wife participated in the business for eighteen
years until the husband's death. Shortly before the husband's
death, the couple executed a formal partnership agreement reciting
that the wife had served as the husband's employee until that point
and that he then desired to sell her a half-interest in the business,
which they would then operate as partners. The wife paid a portion
of the sale price in cash and executed notes for the remainder. In
an income-tax return filed for the husband after his death, the wife
included all of the profits from the business up to the date of the
formal agreement, and one-half thereafter. In the original estate tax
return the wife included the entire value of certain jointly owned
property. Later, however, the wife filed an amended estate-tax re-
turn including only half of the value of the jointly owned property
on the theory that she had been an equal partner in the business
since her marriage and that the jointly owned property was pur-
chased with profits from the business.27 1 In the wife's suit in district
court after the Commissioner's denial of her claim for a refund, a
jury found that an equal partnership existed between the husband
and wife from the time of their marriage and that the joint property
in question was purchased with profits from the business.72 On
appeal, the Second Circuit noted that the formal agreement miti-
gated against a finding of partnership, but found that there was
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Citing income
tax cases dealing with the bona fides of family partnerships, the
court stated that the wife appeared "to have been the more domi-
nant one in guiding the business." Concluding that the husband and
wife "conducted the business together and shared the net profits as
equal partners would have done," the court upheld inclusion of only
half the joint property in the husband's gross estate.27 3
270. 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
271. Id. at 179.
272. Id. at 180.
273. Id. at 181. The following cases reach the same result: United States v. Neel, 235
F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Rogan v. Ferry, 154 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1946); Rogan v. Klammerdi-
ner, 140 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1944); Berkowitz v. Comm'r, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Richard-
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In Estate of Ensley24 the wife brought no separate property into
the marriage. Although it was not clear from the trial record what
the husband's net worth was at the time of the marriage in 1953,
$200,000 would be a fair estimate.275 At this time the husband's
principal assets were an amusement park and a restaurant. From
the time of their marriage until the husband's death in 1972, the
couple engaged in various businesses. At the husband's death, the
couple had accumulated jointly owned property with a net fair mar-
ket value in excess of $800,000, most of which was used in the family
businesses.2 7' The court found that the husband and wife had an
agreement to share profits equally and that the wife's services in the
businesses, especially the most successful one, were "at least equal
in value" to those of the husband. 27 In the Tax Court, the wife
argued for exclusion from the husband's gross estate of half of the
jointly owned property, basing her claim of contribution to the
acquisition of the properties in question on her services rendered in
the joint businesses. The Commissioner argued for full inclusion
of the joint property in the husband's gross estate on the ground
that the wife had failed to trace any contributions to specific items
of joint property, and that the source of the contributions for the
joint properties was traceable to the husband's original capital.2 7 1
The court agreed with the Commissioner, noting that the wife had
failed to present evidence establishing the value of her services in
relation to the husband's capital and service contributions or to
trace the profits from the businesses to specific joint properties.
The businesses did not show significant profits on the couple's
income tax returns until after the joint properties were largely paid
for. The court concluded that no basis existed, in view of the wife's
son v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Estate of Otte v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (P-H)
317 (1972); Estate of Trafton, 27 T.C. 610 (1956); Estate of Giuliani, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 673
(1952); Estate of Fletcher, 44 B.T.A. 429 (1941); Estate of Waterman, 9 T.C.M. (P-H) 841
(1940).
274. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1627 (1977).
275. See id. at 1627-28.
276. Id. at 1628-30.
277. Id. at 1631. Indeed, it appeared from the record that, although major management
decisions were made jointly by the husband and wife, the wife's efforts were largely responsi-
ble for the success of their most prosperous enterprise. The wife, however, never drew a salary
or entered into any formal agreement with the husband. Id. at 1628. During their nineteen-
year partnership, the couple engaged in various real estate transactions and made improve-
ments to various properties. Although the record was somewhat sketchy in this regard, it
appeared that the principal collateral used in these transactions stemmed from the property
brought into the marriage by the husband. In addition, according to the couple's joint income
tax returns, the businesses were relatively unprofitable until about two years prior to the
husband's death, at which time much of the indebtedness on the joint property had already
been discharged. Id. at 1632-33.
278. Id. at 1631.
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burden of proof, for allowing an exclusion of fifty percent of the
joint property from the gross estate.2 " The court did, however,
allow an exclusion of $18,300 in the value of the jointly held property
as representing half the indebtedness on the property discharged
during 1970 and 1971. During these years, it found the wife owned
$25,000 in profits from the businesses that could have been used for
this purpose.280
The Ensley case thus illustrates how the contribution-furnished
test of section 2040(a) and the absence of a formal business arrange-
ment between spouses can result in adverse tax consequences .28
Had the husband and wife in Ensley entered into a formal partner-
ship agreement at the time of their marriage, the husband's gross
estate would have included only half the value of their assets as his
partnership interest. 28 2 This situation, at least in part, motivated
Congress to enact the fractional interest rule of section 2040(b) in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.m New section 2040(c), enacted by the
Revenue Act of 1978, represents a more realistic effort to deal with
the problem.
(2) Section 2040(c)
Section 2040(c) provides an elective rule for excluding from the
gross estate a portion of the value of jointly held property used in a
farm"' or in any other trade or business. The value of this portion
is based on "material participation" by the surviving spouse in the
business. In order to qualify as section 2040(c) property the dece-
dent, the surviving spouse, or both must have created the joint
interest, and only the spouses may be joint owners?. Only real
279. Id. at 1632. The court also rejected the wife's argument that the appreciation in
value of certain of the properties was attributable to her fractional interest in the properties
and therefore should be excluded from the gross estate. See Part IV A (2) supra. The court
did not explain how the reductions in indebtedness upon the joint properties were accom-
plished. It would seem that some funds generated by the joint businesses must have been
used to discharge these mortgages.
280. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1633.
281. See also Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Estate of
Silvester v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1815 (1977); Estate of Drazen, 48 T.C.1 (1967); Estate
of Heidt, 8 T.C. 969 (1947); Estate of Awrey, 5 T.C. 222 (1945).
282. See Hocky, Wife's Services May Avoid Inclusion of Jointly Held Property in Hus-
band's Estate, 34 J. TAx. 174, 174-75 (1971) (analyzing some of the cases, discussing the
importance of local law, and drawing some planning conclusions). See also Ellis, Estate and
Gift Tax Planning for the Termination of Joint Interests, 31 J. TAx. 98, 102 (1969) (joint
tenancy as partnership).
283. See generally H.R. REP., supra note 236.
284. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(1), (4), (9). The definition of farm in I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(4), (5) is
incorporated by § 2040(c) (4).
285. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(3).
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property and tangible personal property used in the farm or other
business can qualify.286
The value of an eligible joint interest required to be included
in the decedent spouse's gross estate by virtue of section 2040(c) is
the fair market value of the property on the appropriate valuation
date reduced by the adjusted consideration furnished by the surviv-
ing spouse and the section 2040(c) value of the property.287 The term
adjusted consideration is defined as the consideration furnished by
a spouse determined as under section 2040(a), but not including any
consideration in the form of profits of the business of which the
section 2040(c) property is a part, plus the amount that the section
2040(a) consideration would have earned over the period it was in-
vested in the farm or business if it had been earning six percent
simple interest."* Section 2040(c) value is defined as the excess of
the fair market value of the property on the appropriate valuation
date over the adjusted consideration furnished by both spouses mul-
tiplied by two percent for each year up to a maximum of twenty-
five years that the surviving spouse materially participated in the
farm or business."*
Section 2040(c) has certain limitations. The amount included
in the decedent spouse's gross estate under section 2040(c) must
equal at least fifty percent of the fair market value of the property.2 1"
Total reductions in the value of the decedent spouse's gross estate
resulting from application of section 2040(c) may not exceed
$500,000.21 Furthermore, the executor must make the election to
have section 2040(c) apply within the time period, including exten-
sions, for filing the estate-tax return.29 2
A simple example will illustrate the operation of section
2040(c). H and W purchase Blackacre, a farm, in 1980 for $100,000,
taking title as joint tenants. W provides $90,000 of the purchase
price and H $10,000. The couple makes no election under section
2515 to treat the creation of the joint interest as a gift, nor do they
elect to qualify the property for section 2040(b). H materially partic-
ipates in the farming operations for twenty years until W's death in
286. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(4).
287. I.R.C. H§ 2040(c)(1), (8).
288. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(6).
289. I.R.C. §§ 2040(c)(5), (8). Material participation is to be determined in a manner
similar to that used for purposes of I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1) (net earnings from self-employment).
See notes 301-07 infra and accompanying text.
290. I.R.C. §§ 2040(c)(2)(A), (8).
291. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(2)(B).
292. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(9). The period is nine months after the date of the decedent's
death. I.R.C. § 6075(a).
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2000, at which time the farm has a fair market value of $300,000.
The adjusted consideration furnished by W is $198,000;113 the ad-
justed consideration furnished by H is $22,000."11 The adjusted con-
sideration furnished by both spouses therefore is $220,000. The per-
centage rate is forty percent.2 5 The section 2040(c) value of the
property therefore is $32,000.208 The section 2040(c) value plus H's
adjusted consideration equal $54,000, and thus the value of Black-
acre includible in W's gross estate is $246,000. By comparison,
under section 2040(a), W's gross estate would include $270,000.211 If
W had elected under section 2515 to treat the creation of the joint
interest as a gift, her gross estate would include only $150,000 under
section 2040(b) .298
In order to assess the effectiveness of section 2040(c) in dealing
with the problems of contributions by surviving spouses to joint
interests, it is necessary to examine some of the technical aspects
of section 2040(c) in greater detail. To receive the benefit provided
by section 2040(c), the estate must show that the surviving spouse
materially participated in the farm or business.2 9 Material partici-
pation for purposes of section 2040(c) must be determined "in a
manner similar to" that used for purposes of section 1402(a)(1),
which relates to net earnings from self-employment.""0 The proviso
that material participation be determined "in a manner similar to"
that used for section 1402(a)(1) allows for some variation in the
requirement to suit the purposes of section 2040(c);301 however, the
legislative history of section 2040(c) clearly contemplates that par-
ticipation in both management and operation of the business is
required. 30 2 Recently proposed regulations under section 2032A,"1
which provides a special use valuation for farms and certain other
closely-held business interests and which also has a material partici-
pation requirement determined by reference to section 1402(a), sup-
293. $90,000 plus $90,000 times 6% times 20 years equals $198,000. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(6).
294. $10,000 plus $10,000 times 6% times 20 years equals $22,000.
295. 2% times 20 years equals 40%. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(5)(B).
296. $300,000 minus $220,000 equals $80,000 times 40% equals $32,000. I.R.C. §
2040(c)(5).
297. See Part IV A (1) supra.
298. See Part IV B (1) supra.
299. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(5)(B).
300. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(7).
301. For a discussion of the regulations under § 1402(a) as they relate to § 2032A, which
also has a material participation requirement determined by reference to § 1402(a), see Note,
Material Participation And the Valuation of Farm Land For Estate Tax Purposes Under The
Tax Reform Act of 1976, 66 Ky. L.J. 848 (1977-78).
302. S. REP. on H.R. 6715 at 215.
303. I.R.C. § 2032A. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3, reprinted in 11979] II FED.
TAXES EsT. & Gwr (P-H) T 135,609.
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port this view.3"' Thus the activities of a surviving spouse required
to meet the material participation requirement of section 2040(c),
if accompanied by a profit-sharing or partnership agreement, would
support exclusion of one-half of all joint property acquired with
profits from the business.3 15 Section 2040(c), therefore, will be of
benefit only in the Ensley situation in which it is impossible to trace
profits to specific joint properties,o' or in a case in which husband
and wife cannot contract with respect to services under local law .30
The Ensley case also illustrates another situation upon which sec-
tion 2040(c) will have no effect. In Ensley a portion of the property
in question was not used in the couple's business.3 1 Section 2040(c)
would have no application to this situation.3 9 Section 2040(c) will
also not cover the situation in which a wife, either alone or in con-
junction with the husband, manages the couple's investments, leav-
ing the husband free for other activities.A" The Treasury has
adopted a restrictive interpretation of the "trade or business" re-
quirement under section 2032A and can be expected to do likewise
under section 2040(c) .311 Finally, the section 2040(c) requirement
304. These proposed Regulations state:
In general. Actual employment on a substantially full-time basis (35 hours a week or
more) or to any lesser extent necessary personally to manage fully the farm or business
. . . constitutes material participation.
Factors considered. No single factor is determinative of the presence of material partici-
pation, but physical work and participation in management decisions are the principal
factors to be considered.
Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2032A-3(d)(1), (2).
305. See Part IV C(1)(b) supra. The activities of a wife as a mere clerical employee of
her husband would not appear to meet the material participation requirement since partici-
pation in management decisions is contemplated by § 2040(c). See text accompanying notes
300-04 supra.
306. See text accompanying notes 274-82 supra.
307. See S. REP., supra note 302, at 214-15.
308. See text accompanying notes 274-82 supra.
309. Joint bank accounts are frequently the depositories of profits from husband-wife
businesses. See, e.g., Estate of Drazen, 48 T.C. 1 (1967).
310. See, e.g., Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
311. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b), reprinted in [1979] II FED. TAXES EsT. &
Giwr (P-H) 1 135,609. According to the Proposed Regulations under 2032A:
The term "trade or business" applies only to a business such as manufacturing, mercan-
tile, or service enterprise, or to the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities,
as distinguished from management of the investment assets. No trade or business is
present even though an office and regular hours are maintained for management of
income producing assets, as the term "business" is not as broad under section 2032A as
under Section 162.
Id. An interesting possibility is whether an election under § 2040(c) could be made when the
surviving spouse did not participate in the business. This could be an advantage when the
survivor had contributed valid consideration to the acquisition of the property and the prop-
erty subsequently declined in value. On its face, § 2040(c) does not prevent this result; the
legislative history is of little help in resolving the problem, see generally, S. REP., supra note
302.
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that the executor must elect 2040(c) within the time period for filing
the estate-tax return may present the executor with a difficult deci-
sion. When there is clear material participation, as there was in
Ensley, a profit-sharing agreement will not be difficult to show;
whether profits can be traced to the court's satisfaction, however,
is a more difficult question.312 The executor may have to weigh the
benefits of a fifty percent exclusion against the chances of a failure
of proof such as that in Ensley.
Section 2040(c) is a provision of limited applicability and offers
only limited benefits to the taxpayer. Nevertheless, it will provide
some relief in situations such as that encountered in Ensley.313
Clearly, it is no substitute for a formal business arrangement be-
tween spouses. Moreover, section 2040(c) makes no attempt to solve
the problems of contributions of property by surviving spouses to
joint interests. In sum, the problems in this area of the law remain
substantial.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal estate and gift tax provisions governing taxation of
joint interests remain highly complex and, in many areas, based
upon questionable and uncertain policy. The current rules make
planning difficult because chance often dictates the result. Yet, in
many instances, they offer significant potential for manipulation
and tax-avoidance. Section 2040(a) is an anachronism in the con-
text of the unified estate and gift tax system. Section 2040(b), al-
though mitigating "federal tax discrimination" against a popular
form of co-ownership between spouses, introduces further complex-
ity into the law. Section 2040(c) provides limited relief for the inter-
spousal transfer problem, but only with respect to transfers of serv-
ices. The problems encountered in working with the estate and gift
tax provisions governing joint interests and the inherent conflict
between joint ownership and federal estate tax-planning objectives
demonstrate the need for comprehensive reform in the area of estate
and gift taxation of spouses. Given the widespread extent of joint
ownership, it would seem that an important goal of taxation in this
area should be to produce a simple system that treats similarly
situated taxpayers equally.
HUGH D. BROWN
312. See note 281 supra.
313. A substantial exclusion would occur in Ensley because the wife materially partici-
pated for nineteen years and the property apparently appreciated from around $200,000 to
over $800,000. In this situation § 2040(c) would exclude approximately $140,000. See notes
274-82, 284-96 supra.
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